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Executive Summary

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a multi-agency initiative intended to reduce serious gun crime through coordinated enforcement, prosecution, intervention, and prevention strategies. Detroit PSN received federal funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance in 2016, engaged in a planning period, and became operational in the city's 8th precinct in 2017 and 2018. This report presents the results of an evaluation of the impact of PSN on fatal and non-fatal shootings. Key findings include:

- Comparing the three years prior to implementation (2014-2016) with the two years of an operational PSN initiative, fatal shootings slightly increased (+2.76%), non-fatal shootings significantly declined (-30.67%), and combined fatal and non-fatal shootings declined (-28%).
- In order to better estimate the extent to which these trends in fatal and non-fatal shootings reflect the impact of PSN, the evaluation used a synthetic control model to create a synthetic comparison or counterfactual 8th precinct from similar areas of the city of Detroit where PSN was not occurring.
- The results of the synthetic comparison resulted in an estimated 19% decrease in fatal and non-fatal shootings in the PSN target area of the 8th precinct.

The results suggest that the comprehensive strategy, whereby core PSN partnerships and strategies were complemented with additional violence reduction strategies (e.g., Detroit Ceasefire, Project Green Light Detroit, Detroit One, and GUNSTAT) resulted in reduced

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods: Final Project Report

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a U.S. Department of Justice, nationwide initiative designed to reduce violent crime and create and foster safe neighborhoods at the local, state, and tribal levels (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001). The PSN model has advocated strategic problem solving to tailor strategies to local violent crime problems; support highly focused interventions; and combine enforcement, intervention, prevention, and community building. The model also encourages the development of practitioner-researcher partnerships that promote the use of data-driven approaches to make communities safer. PSN evaluations at the national (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, & Bynum, 2010) and local level (e.g., Braga, 2008; Hipple, 2010; McGarrell & Bynum, 2010) yield positive results, suggesting that focused PSN strategies, particularly those that are implemented with intensity and fidelity, can reduce gun crime and victimization.

Detroit PSN builds on the traditional PSN model by combining focused enforcement with youth outreach and intervention. Furthermore, the PSN strategy was implemented in Detroit's 8th precinct, one of the most violent crime precincts on its westside. The Detroit PSN initiative was funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance through a fiscal year 2016 award. This included a planning period in 2016, and implementation of PSN in 2017 and 2018. The following report provides an overview of the Detroit PSN model, description of major activities, assessment of impact on violent crime, and lessons learned.

Description of Detroit PSN

Context

The city of Detroit has suffered from rather severe economic challenges and long-term population loss. Detroit lost approximately 600,000 of its original 1.8 million residents between 1950 and 1980, while continued declines resulted in a population of approximately 675,500 residents in 2016. In 2013, the city declared bankruptcy. Loss of business, the decline in the automotive industry, and population loss resulted in decreased funding for public services including public safety. Following decades of citywide economic declined, the city experienced an increase in abandoned properties, chronically disadvantaged neighborhoods, and crime problems. Making matters worse, Detroit is consistently ranked among U.S. cities with the most serious violent crime. For example, the murder rate in Detroit in 2016 was 45.2 per 100,000 residents, over 9 times the national average (5.3 per 100,000 residents). Furthermore, its violent crime rate was 2047 per 100,000 residents, over 5 times the national average (386 per 100,000) (FBI, 2016).

Over the last several years, there has been a resurgence of the city including increased private investment in downtown Detroit, new housing developments, and the development of a streetcar line. Reducing levels of violent crime is recognized by city and criminal justice officials as a key component of revitalization efforts. In recent years, significant efforts have been made to revitalize Detroit's downtown and midtown areas, as well as neighborhoods throughout the city, and to develop highly focused public safety and crime prevention and control efforts. Detroit PSN was designed as part of this overall strategy. This strategy focused on the 8th precinct, located in Detroit's westside, due to its high levels of gun and gang violence.

Detroit PSN Model

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) focuses on violent crime in the Detroit Police Department's (DPD) 8th Precinct. PSN is built upon strong partnerships involving the DPD, Wayne County Prosecutor's Office (WCPO), Redford Police Department (RPD), Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC), Michigan State Police (MSP), U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Additionally, Detroit PSN leverages numerous partnerships through collaboration with Detroit Ceasefire (focused deterrence aimed at gang and group violence), GUNSTAT (tracking and risk assessment of all gun-involved arrestees), Detroit One (chronic violent offender program), Project Green Light Detroit (place-based strategy through partnerships with small businesses), outreach and services specialists, and the schools. PSN also builds upon precinct-level initiatives including community Compstat, and collaboration with neighborhood associations and the faith community. Black Family Development, Inc. serves as the fiscal agent and Michigan State University (MSU) serves as the Research Partner (RP).

Following a strategic planning period in 2016, Detroit PSN formally entered an implementation phase in January 2017. The first year involved targeted enforcement led by the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Partnership (CVRP). The CVRP task force includes local, state, and federal law enforcement partners, including federal and county prosecutors, and probation and parole agents from the MDOC. The CVRP enforcement activities included collaboration with task force partners involved in long-term investigations resulting in arrest and prosecution of members of violent street groups; targeted enforcement operations on hotspot areas developed by the RP team in collaboration with the CVRP; prioritized parole/probation compliance monitoring; and prioritized prosecution. These efforts were complemented and reinforced by Detroit Ceasefire that included gang- and group-focused deterrence efforts aimed at the groups involved in gun violence in the 8th precinct. These activities included targeted enforcement (disruption), call-in meetings, custom notifications, and outreach (mentoring and linkage to services). Over the course of this PSN initiative, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and DPD also increasingly integrated intelligence from the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN). Additionally, the 8th precinct engaged business owners to become involved in Project Green Light, and prevention activities focused on working with the schools on Project Sentry and on leadership mentoring.

Nature and Basis of Intervention

The Detroit PSN initiative prioritized focused enforcement strategies supported by youth prevention and community building efforts. These strategies included long-term investigations of key violent street groups; investigations focused on Detroit One chronic violent offenders; hotspot patrols and enforcement; coordinated parole/probation-police compliance checks; and coordinated federal-state prosecution. This combination of highly focused people- and place-based strategies has been supported in prior PSN- and related-research (e.g., Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2012; Bynum et al., 2006; McGarrell & Bynum, 2010; McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, & Wilson, 2001; McGarrell et al., 2010; McGarrell, Circo, & Rydberg, 2015). The RP team supported enforcement strategies similar to the Los Angeles Police Department Laser strategy

(Uchida & Swatt, 2013). This involved identifying hotspot locations and chronic offenders in and around the hotspots for highly focused ("laser") investigations and enforcement. Following principles of Smart Prosecution (Decker et al., 2006), the USAO and WCPO provided dedicated prosecutors to screen gun-crime cases and determine which cases should be prosecuted federally or locally.

The PSN enforcement and intervention strategy also benefited through integration of the city's Ceasefire strategy with PSN. Detroit Ceasefire follows the focused deterrence, gang and group violence reduction strategy that has demonstrated violence reduction impact nationally (e.g., Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, 2018) as well as in Detroit specifically (Circo, McGarrell, Krupa, DeBiasi, 2018). This strategy involves identification of groups and gangs involved in violence, communication of a deterrence message to high-risk individuals and groups, targeted enforcement when violence continues, and outreach and linkage to services. Prior to 2016, PSN and Ceasefire operated separately with PSN focused on the westside and Ceasefire on the eastside of Detroit. These strategies were integrated in 2016 in the 8th precinct, thereby combining the focused enforcement of the CVRP task force with the focused deterrence model of Ceasefire.

Detroit PSN's prime prevention strategy involved offering Project Sentry in Detroit public schools. Project Sentry involves local, state, and federal enforcement volunteers that educate youth about the dangers and consequences of gun violence. Overtime this program expanded to include additional school-based programs involving mentoring and leadership development.

Enforcement Metrics

Table 1 summarizes some of the key metrics reflecting Detroit PSN activities. These estimates should be viewed conservatively. The PSN/CVRP Task Force maintained careful records of the enforcement activities, particularly with respect to highly focused hotspot enforcement. However, the multi-agency nature of the project, as well as the shared responsibilities across the CVRP Task Force, the 8th precinct, the Gang Intelligence Unit, and additional federal-local task forces, made tracking performance metrics difficult. Furthermore, it was difficult to distinguish between routine enforcement actions and Detroit PSN/CVRP-specific strategies. Importantly, these metrics do not fully illustrate the significant enforcement, prevention, and community outreach activities of DPD and their partners. With these qualifications in mind, as shown in Table 1, Detroit PSN has witnessed significant enforcement activity during this time period.

Table 1. Key PSN Metrics – All PSN Activities, April 2017 – December 2018

Arrests	MDOC Compliance Checks	Guns Confiscated
191	1260	108

The MSU RP played an instrumental role in guiding enforcement activities within the 8th precinct through providing timely analyses for the CVRP team, including weekly gun crime incident reports and specialized analyses. In addition, the MSU RP utilized several spatial analytical techniques - including Kernel Density Estimation, Getis-ord Gi* and Risk Terrain Modeling – to identify fatal and non-fatal shooting hotspot areas. The results of these analyses were used by CVRP – along with intelligence from federal and state partners - to plan targeted

enforcement operations within identified hotspot areas. Overall, CVRP conducted nine targeted PSN operations, resulting in the confiscation of 63 guns, 196 arrests, and the confiscation of $74,436 worth of narcotics (see Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2. Targeted Hotspot Operations, 2017

Key Enforcement Activities	Apr-17	Aug-17	Oct-17
Arrests	18	19	3
MDOC Compliance Checks	68	48	43
Violations Discovered	1	1	-
Persons Investigated	171	25	-
SOR Compliance Checks	0	0	-
SOR Violations	0	0	-
Guns Confiscated	4	4	2
Street Value of Confiscated Narcotics	$24,407.00	$2,449	-
Warrants Served/Executed/Obtained	14	9	-
Traffic Enforcement	31	4	-
Street Enforcement	0	0	-

Table 3. Targeted Hotspot Operations, 2018

Key Enforcement Activities	Jan-18	Apr-18	Jun-18	Aug-18	Oct-18	Dec-18
Arrests	-	11	62	11	43	29
MDOC Compliance Checks	47	70	62	56	61	49
Violations Discovered	-	-	-	0	7	0
Persons Investigated	-	-	-	15	535	202
SOR Compliance Checks	-	130	-	107	0	0
SOR Violations	-	15	-	36	0	0
Guns Confiscated	2	8	11	2	18	12
Street Value of Confiscated Narcotics	-	-	-	$9,630	$14,413	$23,537
Warrants Served/Executed/Obtained	10	13	17	11	20	13
Traffic Enforcement	-	-	-	0	0	128
Street Enforcement	-	-	-	3	0	0

Additionally, from mid-2016 when Ceasefire expanded to the 8th precinct through the end of 2018, there were 13 call-in meetings with high-risk gangs and violent street groups. Five of these focused on the westside, including the 8th precinct, and two call-ins combined gangs/groups from the east and westside. Call-in meetings were complemented with custom notifications whereby the Ceasefire message was delivered to individuals. The message of the call-ins and custom notifications was reinforced by several major long-term gang enforcement operations involving federal-local task forces. Examples of these long-term investigations and subsequent prosecutions included the Vice Lords, Playboy Gangster Crips, and RTM. Additional gang and group enforcement activities were focused on groups including Joy Road. Charges in these operations included murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and drug trafficking. One of the federal indictments included 14 defendants on racketeering charges.

The long-term investigations were complemented with day-to-day tracking of firearms arrests and joint federal and county prosecution reviews to prioritize the appropriate venue for prosecution. These activities involved a joint team comprised of DPD, ATF, and federal and county prosecutors.

The combination of Ceasefire enforcement, PSN/CVRP hotspot enforcement, coordinated firearms prosecution screening, and long-term task force operations, as well as Ceasefire call-ins and custom notifications, created a synergy between PSN and Ceasefire. Ceasefire delivered a message to high risk individuals, groups, and gangs that was made credible through enforcement and prosecution of key groups and individuals involved in violence in the 8th precinct.

Evaluation Context & Methods

Trends in Non-Fatal and Fatal Shooting Victimizations

Before evaluating the effect of PSN on fatal and non-fatal shooting victimizations in Detroit, we first must examine the trends in shootings that occurred throughout the city from 2014 through 2018, this study's evaluation period. Importantly, we exclude from our analysis suicides, self-inflicted shootings, and accidental firearm discharges.

As demonstrated in Table 4 Detroit has experienced a 21.07% decrease in annual combined fatal and non-fatal shootings from 2014 to 2018, and a 4.34% decrease from 2017. These trends are driven by fewer annual non-fatal shootings which experienced a 28.46% decrease from 2014 to 2018, and a 10.34 % decrease from 2017 (see Figure 1).

Table 4. Fatal and Non-Fatal Shooting Trends, Detroit (2014 – 2018)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	% Change 2014 - 2018	% Change 2017 - 2018
Fatal	232	241	249	220	261	12.50	18.64
Non-Fatal	1054	1039	957	841	754	-28.46	-10.34
Total	1286	1280	1206	1061	1015	-21.07	-4.34
Per month	107.2	106.7	100.5	88.4	84.6	-21.08	-4.30

Figure 1: Fatal and Non-Fatal Shooting Trends, Detroit (2014 - 2018)



Despite experiencing an increase in annual fatal shootings, Detroit's declining trend in annual combined fatal and non-fatal shootings is noteworthy given the nationwide increase in homicide and violent crime that occurred in 2015 and 2016. In particular, there was a reported 10.8% nationwide increase in homicides in 2015, and an 8.4% increase over 2015 and 2016 (Uniform Crime Reports, 2015, 2016a). In spite of these trends, Detroit experienced unprecedented declines in homicides during this period as indicated by an 11.95% decrease in the annual homicide rate from 2016 to 2017, and an 8.51% decrease from 2014 (see Table 5). Furthermore, as demonstrated in Figure 2, Detroit was the only major Midwestern city that experienced these types of declines, avoiding the national uptick in violent crime.

Table 5. Homicide Trends, Select Midwestern Cities (2014-2017)

Homicide Rate	Detroit	Chicago	Cincinnati	Cleveland	Indianapolis	Milwaukee	St. Louis
2014	43.5	15.1	20.2	16.2	15.8	15.0	49.9
2015	43.8	17.5	22.1	25.6	17.1	24.2	59.3
2016	45.2	28.1	19.1	35.0	17.1	23.5	59.8
2017	39.8	24.1	23.4	27.8	17.9	19.8	66.1
% Change 2014 -2017	-8.51	59.60	15.84	71.60	13.29	32.00	32.46
% Change 2016 -2017	-11.95%	-14.23	22.51	-20.57	4.68	-15.74	10.54

Figure 2: Homicide Trends, Select Midwestern Cities (2014-2017)



Although Detroit emerged relatively unaffected by the national uptick in violent crime, the 8th precinct, along with the 7th, 11th, and 12th precincts, experienced increases in annual combined fatal and non-fatal shootings from 2014 to 2016, reflecting the national trend of heightened levels of violent crime (see Table 6 and Figure 3). In particular, the 8th precinct experienced its largest annual combined fatal and non-fatal shootings in 2016. This increase was one of the factors that lead to the 8th precinct being selected as the PSN target area.

Table 6. Combined Annual Fatal and Non-fatal Shooting Victims by Precinct (2014 – 2018)

Precinct	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	% Change 2014 to 2016
2	126	118	123	128	108	-2.38
3	79	65	66	79	45	-16.46
4	85	92	65	80	54	-23.53
5	107	89	74	65	71	-30.84
6	154	129	124	89	86	-19.48
7	64	67	72	45	45	12.50
8	131	144	166	114	124	26.72
9	189	240	162	175	184	-14.29
10	138	102	105	91	97	-23.91
11	107	105	109	93	95	1.87
12	106	129	140	102	106	32.08
Average	116.91	116.36	109.64	96.45	92.27	-6.22



Furthermore, Figure 4 shows that the 8th precinct experienced a decline in combined annual fatal and non-fatal shooting victims during the PSN initiative (2017-18). Mirroring the citywide trend, the 8th precinct experienced a slight rise in annual fatal shootings (+2.76%) and a decline in annual non-fatal shootings (-30.67%) when comparing the three-year pre-intervention period with the two-year PSN evaluation period (see Table 7).

Table 7. Fatal and Non-Fatal Shooting Trends, 8th Precinct (2014 – 2018)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	% Change from 2014-16 to 2017-18
Fatal	27	23	41	25	41	2.76
Non-Fatal	104	121	125	89	83	-30.67
Total	131	144	166	114	124	-28.00
Per month	10.92	12.00	13.83	9.50	10.33	-2.34

Figure 4: Fatal and Non-Fatal Shooting Trends, Detroit 2014 - 2018



A breakdown of fatal and non-fatal shootings by quarter helps further shed light on these trends (see Figure 5). As previously mentioned, the 8th precinct experienced a precipitous rise in fatal and non-fatal shootings in 2016 during the nationwide increase in homicide and violent crime. The pinnacle of fatal and non-fatal shootings occurred in the third quarter of 2016, with the 8th precinct experiencing a total of 60 fatal and non-fatal shootings. In the following quarter, fatal and non-fatal shootings declined by 33.33%. Furthermore, fatal shootings were higher in every quarter of 2018 than what was reported in the same quarter of 2017. Excluding the final quarter of 2018, non-fatal shootings were lower in every quarter of 2018 than what was reported in the same quarter of 2017. The final two quarters of 2018 experienced the greatest quarterly combined fatal and non-fatal shootings since the start of PSN. Despite an increase in fatal shootings, there was an overall decline in the combined fatal and non-fatal shootings in the PSN target area during the PSN initiative. The decline was most significant in 2017 and was somewhat offset by increases in the last two quarters of 2018.

Figure 5: Fatal and Non-Fatal Quarterly Shooting Trends, 8th Precinct (2014 - 2018)



Synthetic Control Model

At first glance, a review of trends in fatal and non-fatal shootings raises questions about the impact of PSN. On the one hand, there was a large decrease in non-fatal shootings during the PSN project period compared to the previous three years. On the other hand, there was a slight increase in fatal shootings and an increase in non-fatal shootings toward the end of 2018. Additionally, this review does not account for the fact that the 8th precinct is substantially different than other precincts; it had among the highest number of fatal and non-fatal shootings throughout the city. Furthermore, this initial review of trends is unable to isolate the effect of the intervention from overall city crime rate trends. In other words, how do the trends in the 8th precinct compare to other similar areas of the city? Therefore, in order to estimate the impact of the PSN strategy, we chose to utilize a quasi-experimental design that accounts for potential selection biases and allows us to estimate *what would have happened* absent the PSN strategy. While many such designs exist, we chose to utilize a synthetic control model due to its superiority and robustness compared to other approaches (e.g., propensity score matching, and difference-in-difference estimation).

A synthetic control model utilizes information about people or places that *did not* receive an intervention, and generates a plausible estimate of what likely would have happened absent the intervention. We utilized the 'gsynth' package available in the R statistical environment to generate this estimate (Xu, 2017). In particular, the gsynth package utilizes information from observations that did not receive the PSN strategy prior to it taking place, and constructs weighted averages of these observations to resemble the PSN target area prior to the intervention. This process facilitates the construction of a synthetic control or counterfactual 8th precinct which never received the PSN strategy. The actual 8th precinct and synthetic control can then be compared in the post-treatment period to determine the effect of the PSN strategy. The

gsynth package allows standard errors, 95% confidence intervals, and corresponding "p-values" to be calculated using a parametric bootstrap procedure (Xu, 2017).
We utilize an additive model in which average weights are calculated using the number of *quarterly* fatal and non-fatal shootings for every *police precinct*, as well as data on quarterly aggravated assaults, property crimes, and robberies. Detroit is comprised of 11 precincts, 10 of which are outside the PSN target area. Further, the 6th precinct was excluded from our analysis since it received the PSN intervention in 2014. Therefore, 9 police precincts were considered as part of the donor pool from which the synthetic control could be constructed. The discussion of the results of our model are documented below.

Figure 6: Detroit Precincts



Effect of PSN on Fatal and Non-Fatal Shooting Victimizations: All Precincts (excluding the 6th Precinct)

Figure 7 shows the results of our synthetic control model for the 8th precinct, with an intervention start date of Q1 2017. The model estimated that the PSN strategy had an overall *negative* effect on fatal and non-fatal shootings in the 8th precinct. In particular, the model estimated that the strategy was responsible for a decrease of 5.77 (95% CI: -10.16, -0.9928) fatal and non-fatal shooting victimizations per-quarter, reflecting an overall 19% decrease. This overall pattern of a

decline in the 8th precinct is also reflected in Table 8 and Figure 8. Excluding Q1 2017 and Q1 2018, the synthetic estimate of fatal and non-fatal shootings was higher in every quarter of the post-treatment period than what was observed in the 8th precinct (see Table 8). Additionally, the greatest negative difference in fatal and non-fatal shootings associated with the PSN strategy was observed in Q2 2018 (an estimated 60% decline; see Figure 8).

Figure 7: Estimated Effect of the PSN Strategy in Precinct 8, Intervention Start Date Q1 2017



NOTE: Figure 7 shows the quarterly number of fatal and non-fatal shooting victims (in black), the counterfactual estimate (in blue), and raw observed data for all control precincts (in gray). Time is measured by quarter, with an intervention start time indicted (in red) at time = 0.

Table 8. Differences in Combined Fatal and Non-Fatal Shootings: PSN vs. Synthetic Control by Quarter

	Q1 2017 (0)	Q2 2017 (1)	Q3 2017 (2)	Q4 2017 (3)	Q1 2018 (4)	Q2 2018 (5)	Q3 2018 (6)	Q4 2018 (7)
PSN (Observed)	34	24	32	25	30	22	36	36
Synthetic (Estimated)	33.40	33.53	40.79	34.19	25.43	35.30	40.31	42.19
Difference	0.60	-9.53	-8.79	-9.19	4.57	-13.30	-4.31	-6.19

Furthermore, an interesting finding from the synthetic comparison displayed in Table 8 and Figure 8, is that despite the increases in fatal and non-fatal shootings observed in the 8th precinct in the last two quarters of 2018, these were still considerably below what was estimated to have occurred absent the PSN strategy.



Conclusion

Summary of Findings

The 8th precinct was selected as the target area for PSN based on historic high levels of gun violence as well as an increase in 2016. During the two year PSN intervention, the 8th precinct experienced a slight overall increase in fatal shootings (+2.76%), a large decrease in non-fatal shootings (-30.67%), and a decrease in the annual combined number of fatal and non-fatal shootings (-28%). The picture was somewhat complicated by increases observed in the last two quarters of 2018. As with all analyses of pre- and post- trend comparisons, the issue that arises is: compared to what?

To better understand whether the PSN strategy was effective at reducing fatal and non-fatal shootings, we utilized a synthetic control model which allowed us to estimate *what would have happened* absent the PSN intervention. Overall, this model lends support to the effectiveness of the PSN strategy to reduce fatal and non-fatal shooting victimizations. Indeed, we estimate an overall decline of 19% in combined fatal and non-fatal shootings when comparing the PSN target area with similar areas of the city. The estimated decline in the 8th precinct was observed in six of the eight quarters that PSN was operational. Furthermore, the greatest negative difference in fatal and non-fatal shootings associated with the PSN strategy occurred in Q2 2018. During this quarter, the CVRP conducted two targeted PSN operations: April and June. Its June operation was its most successful, yielding a total of 62 arrests. Thus, we contribute the substantial difference between the observed and estimated number of fatal and non-fatal shootings for Q2 2018 to be attributed to the two targeted operations – particularly the June operation – that occurred during this period. Finally, it is worth noting that the increase in fatal and non-fatal shootings observed in the last two quarters of 2018, was less than what would have been expected given larger increases in the synthetic control areas.

Implications & Lessons Learned

Detroit PSN reflects the benefits of establishing strategic partnerships between local, state, and federal criminal justice partners, community partners, and research partners, to focus on a specific crime problem – gun and gang violence. Overall, our analyses suggest that the PSN strategy in the 8th precinct was associated with a reduction in fatal and non-fatal shooting victimizations. However, our evaluation has its limitations. To start, it did not include assessments of the impact of community engagement efforts or related school-based prevention programs associated with PSN. Consequently, these impacts are not accounted for in our evaluation report.

Regarding our synthetic control model, disentangling the effects of the PSN strategy from other DPD policing initiatives which occurred during the evaluation period posed a difficult problem for our evaluation. Recall that the gysnth package utilizes information from precincts that *did not* receive the PSN intervention to construct the synthetic control. The actual 8th precinct and synthetic control can then be compared in the post-treatment period to determine the effect of the PSN strategy. While comparison precincts did not receive the PSN intervention, they did receive proactive enforcement attention through other initiatives, most notably Ceasefire. Ceasefire first began in the 5th and 9th precincts in 2013, and expanded to include the 6th, 8th and 12th precincts in 2016, and the 4th and 7th precincts in 2018. Therefore, our analysis compares the 8th precinct to areas that also received proactive enforcement attention, rather than basic levels of police services. Furthermore, while the PSN strategy was being implemented in the 8th precinct in 2017 and 2018, so too was Ceasefire.

Ceasefire and PSN are complementary violence prevention strategies. As such, Ceasefire resources were leveraged by the PSN/CVRP team to fulfill the goals of PSN. For this reason, PSN can be interpreted as a "packaged strategy" that utilized the resources and strategies of Ceasefire to its benefit. Although our analysis found the PSN strategy to be associated with a reduction of fatal and nonfatal shootings in the 8th precinct, the extent to which this effect is confounded with the effect of other proactive strategies that occurred within the 8th precinct in parallel with the PSN strategy, such as Ceasefire, is unknown. From a policy standpoint, it makes sense to integrate strategies such as PSN, Ceasefire, Project Greenlight Detroit, and similar violence prevention efforts. From an evaluation perspective, however, it makes it difficult to isolate the specific program components responsible for the observed declines in violence. For these reasons, our results indicate cautious optimism for the PSN program in Detroit.

Similar to previous PSN efforts in Detroit and national efforts, Detroit PSN reflects the value in partnerships across agencies to address group- and gang-related gun crimes. Whether discussing enforcement actions, prosecution, communication of a deterrence message, school-based prevention, or community engagement, the PSN initiative reflected a wide range of local, state, federal, and community partnerships.
Several suggestions for future gun crime reduction strategies emerge. First, the type of partnerships observed in the PSN/CVRP task force, appear to be an important component of strategic efforts to reduce levels of gun crime and victimization. Second, a period to allow for strategic planning can assist the timeliness of implementation and the coordination of various

program components. Finally, although it complicates the evaluation, the integration of multiple people-, group-, and place-based strategies, ranging from targeted enforcement to prevention, community engagement and neighborhood development, appears to be contributing to violence reduction and enhanced public safety in Detroit.

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