

Ceasefire Detroit Outreach: A Mixed-Methods Process Evaluation Report

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Executive Summary

Violent crime remains a challenge for many large urban cities. Detroit, Michigan is among the nation's most violent cities. Despite relatively high levels of violence, Detroit has been experiencing a resurgence with increases in businesses, jobs, and tourism in the past decade. To increase public safety and support revitalization, Detroit has implemented numerous violence reduction initiatives. Ceasefire Detroit is a cornerstone of Detroit's violence reduction strategies. Ceasefire follows the focused deterrence model aimed at reducing gang- and group-related violence. It includes direct communication of a deterrence message to high-risk individuals and groups, targeted enforcement and response to violent incidents, outreach and services, community partnerships, and youth prevention. Ceasefire began in 2013 in two eastside precincts (5th and 9th) and has been operational city wide since 2019. Outreach is a critical component of the program, providing support services for local resident who may be impacted by violent crime, as well as doing a range of community-based events. The Outreach Team is a group of violence interrupters who participate in a range of street- and community-based engagement. The primary aims of this study were identified following the action research model, led by a working group of Detroit Health Department representatives, outreach workers, and university researchers. This report begins by briefly describing focus deterrence, streetbased Outreach, and Ceasefire Detroit.

The study focuses on three topical areas: 1) recent homicide and non-fatal shooting trends; 2) the scope of activities completed by the Outreach Team; 3) the characteristics of Outreach members; and 4) experiences of Outreach staff. The following points summarize key findings from the analysis of violence crime data, Outreach Team activities, Outreach member characteristics, and Outreach staff experiences. Additional detail related to these and other findings is provided in the sections that follow.

Key Findings

- Similar to national and large city trends, Detroit experienced an increase in homicides from 2019-2020. This was followed by a decrease in homicides from 2020-2021, a very slight increase (i.e., one homicide) from 2021-2022, and a decrease from 2022-2023.
- Non-fatal shootings have been decreasing since 2020 but are still elevated relative to 2018 – 2019 figures.
- Since 2020, there have been an average of 62 intakes per year. From 2016-2019, the majority of referrals were from a call-in meeting (61%). From 2020-2023, referrals from call-in meetings accounted for 24% of all referrals.
- Approximately 97% of members who completed an intake in 2022 are considered active, 83% from 2021, and 76% from 2020.

Key Findings - Continued

- It appears as though the Outreach Team is reaching its intended population. Nearly half (47%) of members have less than a high school degree or equivalent. Approximately 10% and 39% of members reported that they didn't have a relationship or had a "poor" relationship with their mother and father respectively. Three percent and 10% reported that their mother and were deceased, respectively. Nearly half reported a family member having a criminal history.
- From May 18, 2024 June 26, 2024, across the three pillars, the Outreach Team commonly engaged in outreach efforts (70%), legal advocacy and support and legal assistance (87%), and 1:1 mentorship (62%).
- From January June 2024, nearly a third of custom notifications were completed.
 Among completed customs approximately two-thirds of recipients were receptive.
- Outreach staff reported a range of challenges in their work, which were categorized into six key areas: instability of the work, systemic barriers, limited resources, mental health and well-being, communicating success, and operating within a focuseddeterrence model.
- Despite the various challenges that emerged, a range of strengths and successes were reported including passion for the work, composition of the team, credibility, and member accomplishments.
- From qualitative data, a theme that emerged was altruistic acts by Outreach staff.
 These were commonly tied to their passion for the work and desire to support their community.
- Another theme that emerged during the focus groups was the complexity of the
 relationship between Outreach and law enforcement. Outreach has a balancing act to
 perform, where they work with law enforcement and simultaneously service a
 community that doesn't always trust the police.
- Outreach staff identified multiple opportunities to improve Outreach work such as the
 program taking a community-led approach, using a holistic approach that encompasses
 additional supports for families (especially parents), additional resources for Outreach
 staff (e.g., company vehicles, insurance, mental health support, therapy), and additional
 resources for individuals who don't meet Ceasefire criteria but are in need.

Introduction

Initially launched in 2013, the Ceasefire Detroit program has been a cornerstone of Detroit's violence reduction strategies. Ceasefire Detroit involves a focused deterrence model aimed at gang- and group-related violence. It involves direct communication of a deterrence message to high-risk individuals and groups, targeted enforcement and response to violent incidents, outreach and services, community partnerships and youth prevention. While the primary goal of focused-deterrence strategies is to prevent crime by changing offender perceptions of sanction risk, other complementary prevention mechanisms seem to support the efficacy of these programs (Braga et al., 2018; Braga & Kennedy, 2012; Kennedy et al., 2017). For example, offering opportunities and resources to support nonviolent behavior or an alternative lifestyle, individuals can be deterred from that specific crime. While informative, the focused deterrence literature has yet to systematically assess complementary prevention mechanisms, such as outreach activities, violence interrupters, and linkages to services to support nonviolent behavior. In Detroit, the Outreach Team plays a central role in the Ceasefire model.

The Outreach Team responds to and provides support services for local residents who may be impacted by violent crime. While referred to as "outreach" their work is akin to that of violence interrupters (Proescholdbell, 2023). The goal of this outreach intervention strategy is to reduce violence by and against young adults; increase integration and coordination of efforts within the community and across agencies and programs which seek to reduce violence (e.g., Project Safe Neighborhoods) and improve quality of life; and promote resiliency, emotional healing and healthy responses to trauma and conflict. The Outreach Team is comprised of outreach workers, support services, resource counselors, and faith-based services. The Outreach Team engages with residents through street-based work including shooting scene response, hospital support for victims, peer exchanges, direct mentorship, community outreach, and more.

The goals of this study were identified following the action research model, led by a working group of Detroit Health Department representatives, outreach workers, and university researchers. Action research is a cyclical process that involves identifying an issue, planning action steps, evaluating action steps, and making adjustments based on evaluation findings. A distinct feature of this approach is that it is carried out collaboratively with those who experience the program and aims to provide new knowledge that can contribute to practical solutions and general knowledge (Elden & Chisholm, 1993).

The Michigan State University (MSU) School of Criminal Justice conducted a mixedmethods process evaluation of Ceasefire Detroit Outreach. This report documents preliminary findings and addresses the following: (1) program enrollment, (2) participant characteristics (3) programmatic activities, and (4) the experiences of Outreach staff (e.g., challenges, strengths). Finally, it identifies recommendations for program refinements aimed at evaluation capacity building and identifying areas of improvement. Evaluation capacity building (ECB) is of interest to researchers and practitioners alike as it seeks to have organizations examine their practices and processes through a process of systematic inquiry. ECB refers to "building the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of organizational members; the sustainability of rigorous evaluative practices; and providing the resources and motivations to engage in ongoing evaluation work" (Sarti et al., 2017, p. 761-762). By investing in ECB, organizations can better understand the effectiveness of program implementation and impact. These recommendations are based on discussions Ceasefire leadership, in-depth focus groups with 18 Outreach staff, analysis of Outreach programmatic and participant data, and programmatic document reviews. This report is divided into the following major sections:

- A brief overview of focused-deterrence, street outreach, and Ceasefire Detroit.
- An overview of the study setting, Detroit, MI and an assessment of violent crime in Detroit including trends in fatal and non-fatal shootings and victim characteristics.
- An overview of evaluation methods used in the current report.
- A summary of key findings as it relates to the development and implementation of Ceasefire Detroit, program enrollment and referrals, participant characteristics, programmatic activities, and experiences of the Outreach Team.
- Proposed recommendations, highlighting strengths to build on and how previously identified challenges may be addressed

Overview of Focused Deterrence, Street Outreach, and Ceasefire Detroit

This section provides a brief overview of 1) the focused deterrence model and its effectiveness in addressing violence, 2) street outreach and research focusing on its scope, role, and effectiveness in addressing violence, and 3) Ceasefire Detroit and the Outreach component of the program.

The Focused Deterrence Model

The focused deterrence model is often referred to as "pulling-levers policing," and has been utilized across the United States through federally sponsored violence prevention programs (Braga & Weisburd, 2012). Braga & Weisburd (2012) identified that this model honors core deterrence strategies, such as increasing risks of apprehension and punishment faced by offenders while finding new and creative ways to deploy traditional and nontraditional law enforcement tools to communicate incentives and disincentives to targeted offenders. Additionally, focused deterrence strategies are distinguished from other controversial policing strategies since intensive crime prevention efforts are focused on specific individuals or groups who are disproportionately involved in problem behaviors (Brunson, 2015). A well-known focused deterrence strategy was Boston's Operation Ceasefire. Operation Ceasefire in Boston was designed to prevent violence by directly reaching gang affiliates and informing them that violence would not be tolerated. The message that was communicated to targeted gangs was that authorities would pull every legally available "level" when violence occurred (Kenndy, 1997). In addition to coordinated efforts with authorities, youth workers, probation offices and community groups would offer services to these individuals while communicating to gang/group members that violence would not be accepted. These messages were delivered through formal meetings with gang/group members deemed "call-ins". The primary message at call-ins was that continued gang/group involvement and community violence would result in an immediate and intense response from the entirety of the criminal justice system.

Kennedy (2006) identified focused deterrence as a strategy that brings together law enforcement, social services providers, and communities to create a deterrent message to targeted offenders. When the message is delivered to targeted offenders, it is convincing when certain, swift, and highly visible law enforcement actions deliver the promised consequences for a violation (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011). In addition to the deterrent message and increased punishment and enforcement amongst targeted offenders, this model can also provide participants with positive incentives through social services. Positive incentives can encourage law-abiding behavior while rewarding compliance with the law (Zicari, 2021). In Boston's Operation Ceasefire, gang/group outreach workers connected potential offenders with employment services and ran programs intended to keep gang-affiliated youth safe.

Street Outreach Intervention

The street outreach approach to violence prevention has been utilized for more than 50 years and has garnered much attention and research which is briefly summarized below. Notably, those who work in this space have gone by various names, including "streetworkers," "outreach workers," "violence interrupters", and "credible messengers". In the literature, these terms are often used interchangeably to describe efforts to deescalate disputes and connect with and support individuals most at-risk of engaging in violence.

Research documents a wide range activities or tasks conducted by outreach workers, including connecting individuals to services, establishing rapport, building relationships with individuals, case management, and even direct mediation of street conflicts (Frattaroli et al., 2010). Semi-structured interviews with streetworkers and their managers suggested that streetworkers spend much of their time working with individuals who require various services (Frattaroli et al., 2010). Results from the interviews also identified several factors that make street outreach a successful tool or intervention. For example, many streetworkers shared that an effective element of street outreach includes being accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and the reliance on private and public partnerships to provide a wide array of services. Additionally, it has been found that effective outreach workers have lived experiences, have transformed to become community change agents, and possess community credibility, listening skills, and empathy (Martinez et al., 2022). These qualities allow outreach workers to connect with individuals where they are and help them overcome challenges. Martinez et al.'s (2022) research found that credible messengers helped reduce contact between the police and their communities by providing prevention strategies to address harm or violence.

Findings are mixed regarding the impact of street outreach on violence, although commentary provided by Richardson (2022) suggests that credible messengers or outreach workers are effective strategies for connecting individuals with programs or interventions. Additionally, one study found that investment in public health and community-based prevention programs such as Cure Violence could achieve the same reduction in violence as a much larger investment in hot-spot policing (Cerda et al., 2018). Cure Violence utilizes a public health model and approaches violence as an infectious disease. The program tries to interrupt the next event, the next transmission, and the next violent activity. Evaluations of Cure Violence models in Chicago, Illinois; Baltimore, Maryland; Brooklyn, New York City; Phoenix Arizona, and Pittsburg, Pennsylvania show promising results (Butts et al, 2015). The evaluation of Cure Violence in Chicago showed mixed results. This evaluation found that the introduction of Cure Violence significantly reduced shootings in 5 of the 7 program sites and that these trends outperformed matched neighborhoods. However, the researchers concluded that in only one of these sites could they reliably claim that this decline was due to the program (Butts et al., 2015).

Ceasefire Detroit

Ceasefire Detroit (2024) is a community-based violence prevention partnership committed to changing community norms about violence. This includes engagement from Detroit Public Schools, social service providers, numerous community groups, including the faith community, local, state, and federal law enforcement, and federal and county prosecution. Ceasefire Detroit has been at the core of the city's violence reduction efforts since 2013. Ceasefire Detroit has a three-pronged message encompassing law enforcement, a moral voice, and offers of help. The law enforcement message identifies that the level of violence in the community is unacceptable and must stop. If the violence does not stop, perpetrators of violence will face the full force of the law. Secondly, the moral voice informs perpetrators that they must stop shooting as they are hurting families and the community, and that the community wants them to live. Thirdly, offers of help communicate that there are options and a range of services available for those who want help such as mentoring, housing, identification, transportation, expungement, job training and placement, mental health, Graduate Equivalency Degree (GED) preparation, drug treatment, tattoo removal (Detroit Health Department [DHD], 2023). As of July 2023, the Ceasefire Outreach team resides within the DHD. The Outreach Team aims to prevent and promote peace in the community by engaging with individuals involved in or at risk of engaging in violence. In Detroit, the Outreach Team is an essential component of the Ceasefire model. Outreach workers are "individuals who work the street" contacting at-risk individuals or those engaging in violence to provide them with alternatives and opportunities to break away from the cycle of violence (Decker et al., 2008; Ceasefire Detroit, 2024).

Study Setting: Detroit, MI

The City of Detroit has a rich history as a hub of industry, culture, and innovation. Known as the birthplace of the automotive industry, the city eventually experienced a dramatic decline in manufacturing jobs as the automotive industry began to decentralize, building new plants in suburbs and green-fields. Detroit lost over 60% of its residents from its height in the 1950s of approximately 1.8 million residents to roughly 639,000 to 2020. This resulted in a large number of unoccupied homes and a significantly weakened tax base for the City, a challenge that continues to this day. A history of redlining, foreclosure crisis, and systemic disinvestment has contributed to blighted neighborhoods, vacant properties, and inadequate housing options for lower income residents. Across Detroit, 48.8% of the housing units were owner-occupied, compared to 72.5% in the state of Michigan (U.S. Census Bureau, 2023).

Detroit consistently ranks among cities with the highest poverty rates, with substantial disparities in income and access to resources across racial and geographic lines (Gilligan, 2023). Detroit is a predominately Black city, with approximately 78% of residents identifying as Black/African American and 8% identifying as Hispanic/Latino. The median household income in Detroit is \$36,90, substantially lower than the \$66,986 median household income for the state of Michigan. In 2020, there were 75,909 households that are living below the poverty level, and 92,107 households that were receiving Food Stamps/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The largest group of individuals living in poverty are those under the age of 18. Most recently, 10.8% of Detroit residents were unemployed, compared to 4.7% unemployment in Michigan and 4.2% nationwide (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2024)

Relatedly, Detroit has faced persistently high violent crime rates, including homicide and non-fatal shootings. These issues contribute to a sense of insecurity among residents and can hinder economic development. In response to high rates of violent crime, the city has taken a multi-faceted approach to reducing violence. Ceasefire Detroit serves as the cornerstone of Detroit's violence reduction strategies. More recently, Detroit has experienced a revitalization with new businesses opening, more than 35,000 vacant and dilapidated properties have been demolished or revitalized, and there was a slight uptick in its population (i.e., nearly 2,000 residents) (Boudette, 2024). In 2023, the city recorded 252 homicides, the lowest number since 1966 (City of Detroit, 2024).

Violent Crime in Detroit

This section contextualizes violence in Detroit, MI and the historic and continued need for violence prevention and intervention efforts. This includes an overview of homicide and non-fatal shooting victimization trends and victim characteristics.

Table 1 presents homicide rates for select Midwestern cities from 2018 - 2022, providing a comparison of violence rates across select Midwest cities. In 2021 and 2022, Detroit had the highest homicide rate relative to select, large midwestern cities represented in Table 1. In 2021, Detroit had a homicide rate of 48.8 per 100,000 people and 49.6 per 100,000 in 2022. From 2020 to 2021, there was a 7.7% decrease in Detroit's homicide rate, followed by a 1.6% increase from 2021 to 2022.

Table 1. Homicide Rates for Select Midwestern Cities, 2018-2022

	Detroit	Chicago	Cincinnati	Cleveland	Milwaukee	Indianapolis
2018	42.1	21.3	18.7	23.8	17.5	18.4
2019	45.1	18.6	21.6	27.6	17.2	16.5
2020	52.9	28.9	29.7	44.2	33.9	24.5
2021	48.8	13.9	29.1	45.6	34.6	27.1
2022	49.6	26.7	23.6	40.1	37.9	23.6
% Change	-7.7%	-51.9%	-2.0%	+3.2%	+2.1%	+10.6%
2020-2021						
% Change	+1.6%	+92.1%	-18.9%	-12.1%	+9.5%	-12.9%
2021-2022						

Note: Homicide frequencies were compiled from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (2024) Data Explorer. Rates are calculated for every 100,000 persons based on 2022 U.S. Census population estimates. Current estimates represent the most recently available homicide data.

Data on homicides and non-fatal shootings in Detroit were provided by the Detroit Police Department (DPD). As shown in Figure 1, there has been a decrease in the number of non-fatal shootings in Detroit since 2020. However, non-fatal shooting frequencies are still higher than pre-pandemic years (i.e., 2018 and 2019). From 2020 to 2023, there was a 31% decrease in non-fatal shootings and a 22% decrease in homicides. In 2023, Detroit recorded the fewest homicides in the city since 1966 (City of Detroit, 2024). In addition to homicides, Detroit saw reductions in various violent crimes, including sexual assaults, robberies, carjackings, and non-fatal shootings compared to the year before.




Figure 1. Detroit Homicide and Non-Fatal Shooting Frequencies, 2018-2023

In 2023, Detroit recorded 252 homicides. Based on this figure, Detroit had a homicide rate of 40.6 per 100,000 persons. While 2023 homicide data are not available for all cities, year-end homicide frequencies for select cities were reported by individual news stations or police departments. Homicide rates in 2023 for these cities with available data are as follows: Chicago (23.6), Cleveland (45.6), Indianapolis (24.5), and Milwaukee (30.1). As can be seen, Detroit continues to have one of the highest homicide rates among select midwestern cities.

Table 2 displays homicide and non-fatal victimizations by guarter from 2018 through September 2024. The table illustrates that more than a third of all non-fatal shootings occur during the 3rd quarter of each year and that nearly a third of all homicides occur during the 3rd quarter of each year.

Table 2. Homicides and Non-Fatal Shooting Frequencies by Quarter, 2018 – Quarter 3 2024

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Homicide							
Quarter 1	56	38	57	66	59	53	39
Quarter	(21.5%)	(13.9%)	(17.6%)	(21.4%)	(19.1%)	(21.0%)	33
Quarter 2	64	71	84	88	72	70	63
Quarter 2	(24.5%)	(25.9%)	(26.0%)	(28.6%)	(23.3%)	(27.8%)	05
Quarter 3	72	83	88	82	92	75	53
Quarter 5	(27.6%)	(30.3%)	(27.2%)	(26.6%)	(29.8%)	(29.8%)	33
Quarter 4	69	82	94	72	86	54	
Quarter 4	(26.4%)	(29.9%)	(29.1%)	(23.4%)	(27.8%)	(21.4%)	
Totals	261	274	323	308	309	252	
Non-fatal S	hootings						
Quarter 1	137	114	135	189	154	157	139
Quarter	(18.2%)	(14.9%)	(11.5%)	(17.8%)	(16.1%)	(19.5%)	133
Quarter 2	169	196	334	323	264	234	182
Quarter 2	(22.4%)	(25.6%)	(28.5%)	(30.4%)	(27.7%)	(29.1%)	102
Quarter 3	262	260	343	343	310	276	173
Quarter 5	(34.8%)	(34.0%)	(32.3%)	(32.3%)	(32.5%)	(34.3%)	1/3
Quarter 4	185	195	209	209	226	137	
Quarter 4	(24.6%)	(25.5%)	(19.6%)	(19.6%)	(23.7%)	(17.0%)	
Total	753	765	1,021	1,064	954	804	

Note: Percentages are not included for 2024 counts since the full year was not available at the time of this report.

Table 3 provides homicide and non-fatal shooting victim demographic information from 2018-2023. Across the 6-year period, the majority of victims were male (84%), Black (91%), and between the ages of 18 – 35 (65%). These demographic prevalences are similar for each year.

Table 3. Homicide and Non-Fatal Shooting Victim Demographics by Year, 2018-2023

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Totals
Sex	2010					LULJ	Totals
Male	878	885	1,222	1,162	1,053	875	6,075
	(86.8%)	(85.2%)	(82.9%)	(84.7%)	(83.4%)	(83.2%)	(84.3%)
Female	133	154	250	210	210	177	1,134
	(13.2%)	(14.8%)	(17.0)	(15.3%)	(16.6%)	(16.8%)	(15.7%)
Race							
Black	936	954	1,382	1,295	1,171	982	6,720
	(92.5%)	(91.8%)	(93.8%)	(94.4%)	(92.7%)	(93.2%)	(90.9%)
White	62	67	69	47	63	58	366
	(6.1%)	(6.4%)	(4.7%)	(3.4%)	(5.0%)	(5.5%)	(4.9%)
Hispanic	9	14	15	23	201	10	272
	(0.9%)	(1.3%)	(1.0%)	(1.7%)	(1.6%)	(0.9%)	(3.7%)
Arabic	5	4	7	7	9	3	35
	(0.5%)	(0.4%)	(0.5%)	(0.5%)	(0.7%)	(0.3%)	(0.5%)
Age							
0-13	12	13	24	16	14	19	98
	(1.2%)	(1.3%)	(1.6%)	(1.2%)	(1.1%)	(1.8%)	(1.3%)
14-17	48	35	75	61	82	91	392
	(4.7%)	(3.4%)	(5.0%)	(4.4%)	(6.5%)	(8.7%)	(5.4%)
18-25	316	316	486	395	364	307	2,184
	(31.2%)	(31.2%)	(32.6%)	(28.8%)	(28.9%)	(29.2%)	(30.2%)
26-35	331	384	519	516	452	342	2,544
	(32.7%)	(37.0%)	(34.8%)	(37.6%)	(35.8%)	(32.5%)	(35.2%)
36-45	178	170	201	219	156	150	1,074
	(17.6%)	(16.4%)	(13.5%)	(16.0%)	(12.4%)	(14.3%)	(14.9%)
46+	127	119	186	164	193	142	931
	(12.5%)	(11.5%)	(12.5%)	(12.0%)	(15.3%)	(13.5%)	(12.9%)

Note: In 2020, one non-fatal shooting case recorded sex as "other' and one non-fatal shooting case recorded sex as "N" in 2023. Additionally, 4 victim ages were missing in 2023.

Evaluation Methodology

The process evaluation of Ceasefire Detroit Outreach employed a mixed-methods approach to examine the program's structure, operation, and areas of refinement. More specifically this consists of (1) an overview of the Ceasefire Detroit Outreach program, (2) an assessment of enrollments and participant characteristics, (3) an assessment of Outreach activities, and (4) qualitative interviews with Outreach staff to assess their perceptions of their roles and responsibilities, challenges, successes, and relationship with criminal justice organizations. Finally, it identifies recommendations for program refinements. These recommendations are based on programmatic document reviews, analysis of programmatic data on Outreach participants and activities, and three in-depth focus groups with 18 program staff. This section describes the methodological approach for each component of the process evaluation.

Program Development and Implementation Review

An overview of the Ceasefire Detroit development and implementation is based on researcher observations, conversations with stakeholders and program staff, attendance in meetings such as the all partners meeting, and programmatic document reviews. This review established a foundational understanding of the Outreach Team's intended design, enabling the identification of potential gaps between intended and actual implementation.

Analysis of Programmatic Data

All programmatic data related to Outreach activities and participants (commonly referred to as "members") were collected by the Outreach Team at the Detroit Health Department using Smartsheets, a work management software. De-identified information was shared with the research team for the purposes of this report. Demographic information (e.g., age, gender, race) was not available to the research team. Descriptive statistics were used to summarize trends in intakes, referral sources, and characteristics of individuals who completed an intake with Outreach (i.e., members). Outreach participant data encompasses all intakes from January 2016 – June 2024. Due to prevalent "inactive" designation for members who completed an intake prior to 2020, analyses of participant characteristics included those who completed an intake between January 2020 – June 2024.

Additionally, data on programmatic activities was used to summarize activities that occurred within the three Outreach pillars (i.e., community intervention, legal services, and mentorship) to evaluate the scope and regularity of Outreach efforts. Data on custom notifications is recorded by both the Outreach Team and the Detroit Police Department through Smartsheets. A summary of custom notifications, including characteristics of individuals intended to receive a custom notification, is included in the assessment of programmatic activities.

Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis

Within the focused deterrence model, outreach workers work directly with high-risk individuals and the broader community, leveraging their lived experiences and community connections to mediate conflict, prevent violence, and connect individuals to supportive resources (Butts et al., 2015). However, despite their central role, there is a lack of research examining the nuanced experiences, challenges, and contributions of outreach workers within these programs. As such, the current study seeks to better understand the multifaceted experiences of Ceasefire Detroit Outreach workers, their interactions with community and criminal justice organizations, and their pivotal role within the program. This is accomplished through qualitative, semi-structured focus groups with the Outreach Team. This included administration and Outreach workers from the Ceasefire Detroit Outreach team. Interview questions focused on perceptions of their roles and responsibilities, challenges, successes, credibility, and relationship with criminal justice organizations. We invited all members of the Outreach Team to participate in a focus group. This resulted in a total of three focus groups with 18 participants. Interviews were conducted in-person between July and September 2024 and were audio recorded with each participant's consent. The first, second, and third focus groups had 7, 6, and 5 participants respectively. Participants also completed a brief demographic survey prior to the start of the focus group[1]. No identifiable information was collected.

The first focus group in July comprised Ceasefire's administrative personnel who help lead and direct the Ceasefire program. The September focus groups consisted of Ceasefire Outreach workers who primarily interact and engage with Ceasefire members and the community. Each focus group was led by a facilitator who audio-recorded the entirety of the focus groups. Two researchers transcribed and took notes during these sessions. Audio recordings of interviews were transcribed using Otter.ai and then reviewed and revised for accuracy by two researchers. Before the interview began, all the participants consented to participate in the focus group and the audio recording. The three focus groups averaged 89 minutes. Focus groups ranged from 69 minutes to 158 minutes. A copy of the focus group protocol is located in Appendix A. Participants were not paid to complete an interview. Michigan State University's Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved the study.

Given the relatively small number of interviews, coding and analysis of interviews was completed in Microsoft Word. We utilized a "codebook thematic analysis", deductive and inductive approaches (Braun & Clarke, 2021; Roberts et al., 2019). Three researchers created an initial draft of a thematic codebook on based on the interview protocol (i.e., the deductive approach). Subsequently, the researchers each read through each transcript separately to immerse themselves in the qualitative data and made revisions to the codebook accordingly. Next, the three researchers completed coding exercises which consisted of each researcher separately coding two, 2–3-page segments of each transcript. The researchers then compared coding, resolved any discrepancies via discussion, and made modifications to the codebook accordingly. The coding exercises were completed to assess the comprehensiveness of the codebook and assess coding agreement. Finally, each researcher coded each transcript independently and resolved any discrepancies through discussion. Examples of final codes include "challenges with instability", "credibility via lived experiences", and "member motivation".

Study Findings

Development and Implementation of Ceasefire Detroit

Ceasefire Detroit (2024) is a community-based violence prevention partnership committed to changing community norms about violence. This includes engagement from Detroit Public Schools, social service providers, numerous community groups, including the faith community, local, state, and federal law enforcement, and federal and county prosecution. Ceasefire Detroit has been at the core of the city's violence reduction efforts since 2013. Through call-in meetings, Ceasefire Detroit delivers a three-pronged message encompassing law enforcement, a moral voice, and offers of help. The law enforcement message identifies that the level of violence in the community is unacceptable and must stop. If the violence does not stop, perpetrators of violence will face the full force of the law. Secondly, the moral voice informs perpetrators that they must stop shooting as they are hurting families and the community, and that the community wants them to live. Thirdly, the Ceasefire Outreach Team communicates offers of help, that there are options and a range of services available for those who want help such as mentoring, housing, identification, transportation, expungement, job training and placement, mental health, Graduate Equivalency Degree (GED) preparation, drug treatment, tattoo removal (Detroit Health Department [DHD], 2023). The Outreach Team aims to prevent and promote peace in the community by engaging with individuals involved in or at risk of engaging in violence. In Detroit, the Outreach Team is an essential component of the Ceasefire model. Outreach workers are "individuals who work the street" contacting at-risk individuals or those engaging in violence to provide them with alternatives and opportunities to break away from the cycle of violence (Decker et al., 2008; Ceasefire Detroit, 2024).

Ceasefire Detroit was initially funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) (Grant No. 2012-PB-FX-K002) in 2012. Ceasefire Detroit was initially developed and implemented in two East side precincts (5th and 9th). As the Ceasefire team developed expertise in the model, associated project management capacity, shared understanding and training in the model, and initial signs of success, Ceasefire expanded to West side precincts, then eventually was operation citywide. Ceasefire Detroit went through the stages of implementation common to complex interventions involving innovative practices and multiple levels of government, partners, and resource constraints. In 2015 there was a re-organization of the Ceasefire Leadership team, where a new Ceasefire Director was appointed and a project management support team was created. This resulted in a significant emphasis being placed on increasing the use of custom notifications and the development of data tracking tools to provide a mechanism to track Ceasefire activities.

The data management tools served several purposes: sharing information; holding the Ceasefire team accountable; supporting implementation; and tracking progress. As of 2019, the program operates citywide. Originally housed under public safety, the Ceasefire Outreach Team was transitioned to the Detroit Health Department (DHD) in July 2023. This transition resulted in adjustments in how participant information and Outreach activities were conceptualized and recorded. This shift resulted in a more streamlined processes for data entry and enhanced oversight mechanisms to improve the accuracy of reporting, ensuring that data collected and shared were more precise and reliable.

Figure 2 illustrates key events associated with program implementation and operation. For a more detailed timeline of program development and reorganization please see Circo et al. (2018). Notably, the operation of Ceasefire Detroit was severely impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Operations were adjusted accordingly during the pandemic (2020-2021) and Governor Whitmer's "Stay Home, Stay Safe" executive order (Exec. Order No. 2020-21, 2020) to comply with legislative mandates and maintain health and safety.




Figure 2. Timeline of Key Programmatic Events

Note: DPD = Detroit Police Department; OJJDP = Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; PCT = Precinct

Program Enrollment and Referral Source

This section describes Outreach program enrollment and referral source information. and member characteristics, including trend in intakes, referral type, member needs and goals and familial relationships and supports. Please note, demographic information (e.g., age, gender, race) was not available to the research team. Data for the current section derive from the "CF Member Roster" Smartsheet. The member roster included 938 cases. Among these cases, 308 did not have a valid Member ID and an invalid intake year. Therefore, these cases were removed from the current analyses. Additionally, 19 duplicates were identified based on Member ID. Visual inspection of these cases suggests they could present unique cases. For the purposes of this report, they are included in analyses pending review by the Outreach Team. This resulted in a total of 630 members in the current report.

Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of intakes from 2016 to 2023. Since the launch of Ceasefire Detroit in 2016, the Outreach team has completed a total of 630 intakes. The highest number of intakes occurred in 2016 with 126 intakes completed. This was followed by the lowest number of intakes in 2017. On average the Outreach team completes approximately 73 intakes a year.




Figure 3. Frequency of Outreach Intakes, 2016-2023 (n = 630)


Table 4 illustrates the frequency of intakes by quarter from 2016 to Quarter 2 2024.

Table 4. Frequency of Intakes by Quarter, $2016 - \text{Quarter } 2\ 2024\ (n = 630)$

	Quarter 1	Quarter 2	Quarter 3	Quarter 4	Total
2016		41	39	46	126
2017	23			23	46
2018	26	19	13	26	84
2019	20	18	21	18	77
2020	20	5	20	17	62
2021	18	11	4	19	52
2022	12	17	12	18	59
2023	12	22	12	28	74
2024	21	29			N/A


Individuals can become involved in Outreach support through a variety of pathways. Figure 4 illustrates the various referral types and frequency with which members come to engage with the Outreach team. This is based on those who have completed an intake with the Outreach team.

Figure 4. Frequency of Referral Type for Member Intakes, $2016 - \text{Quarter 2 } 2024 \ (n = 630)$



Across the 8.5 year period, the majority of intakes occurred through a call-in meeting, followed by a "referral"[2], and law-enforcement referral. Approximately 46% of referrals were from a call-in meeting, while 20% were from a general "referral".

The way in which individuals are referred to Outreach has changed over the course of the program. Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of referral source by year from 2016-2023. From 2016-2019, call-in meetings were a prominent source of referrals, along with the general "referral" category. In 2020, there was a greater diversity in referral sources which continued through 2023. This may be reflective of pandemic era restrictions and associated adjustments (e.g., call-in meetings could not be held and custom notifications were used in lieu of group meetings) or changes to data entry procedures. In 2023, 27% of referrals came from Outreach, 24% from a call-in, 22% from law enforcement, 20% from a custom notification, 5% from a member, and 1% from faith-based.



Participant Characteristics

Across the 8.5 year period, 321 members (51%) are considered active. Table 5 displays member status by intake year. As might be expected, the majority of members who completed an intake in 2016-2019 are "inactive". All members who completed an intake in the current or previous year are considered "active". The majority of members who completed an intake since 2020 are considered active. Approximately 97% of members who completed an intake in 2022 are considered active, 83% from 2021, and 76% from 2020.

Table 5. Member Status by Intake Year (n = 626)

	Inactive	Active
2016	121 (96.8%)	4 (3.2%)
2017	43 (93.5%)	3 (6.5%)
2018	62 (75.6%)	20 (24.4%)
2019	53 (68.8%)	24 (31.2%)
2020	15 (24.2%)	47 (75.8%)
2021	9 (17.3%)	43 (82.7%)
2022	2 (3.5%)	56 (96.6%)
2023		74 (100.0%)
2024		50 (100.0%)
Total:	305 (48.7%)	321 (51.3%)

Note: Three members were considered "re-evaluate" and one "pending intake". These are not included in the current table.

Importantly, the intake process changed over the course of the program's existence. Given these changes in reporting and the proportion of active members prior to 2020 (i.e., the majority are considered "inactive"), we focus on the characteristics of members who completed an intake between 2020 – present. As seen in Table 6, nearly half (47%) of members have less than a high school degree or equivalent, the majority are single (97%), and just over half don't have any children (55%).

Table 6. Outreach Member Characteristics Who Completed an Intake from 2020 - 2024 (n = 287-297)

Variable	Frequency (%)
Highest Grade Completed	
7 th	1 (0.4%)
8 th	11 (3.8%)
9 th	18 (6.3%)
10 th	37 (12.9%)
11 th	69 (24.0%)
Graduate Equivalency Degree (GED)	31 (10.8%)
High School Diploma	83 (28.8%)
Trade School	7 (2.4%)
College/University	31 (10.8%)
Marital Status	
	2 (1 00/)
Divorced	3 (1.0%)
Married	6 (2.1%)
Single	279 (96.9%)
Children	
0	159 (55.2%)
1	56 (19.4%)
2	30 (10.4%)
3	19 (6.6%)
4 or more	24 (8.3%)
Custody of Children	
No	64 (47.8%)
Yes	37 (27.6%)
Partial	33 (24.6%)
Unemployed	220 (76.4%)
Involved in Court System	198 (68.8%)
Substance Use	158 (54.7%)
Health Insurance	241 (84.0%)
Number of Health Conserns (Pange)	1 – 7
Number of Health Concerns (Range)	
Mean (SD)	2.6 (1.5)
Health Concerns	
Stress	110 (45.8%)
Trauma	99 (41.3%)
Anger Issues	89 (37.1%)
Anxiety	84 (35.0%)
Gunshot Wound	82 (34.2%)
Asthma	55 (22.9%)
Depression	44 (18.3%)
Back Pain/Injury	28 (11.7%)
High Blood Pressure	18 (7.5%)
Emotional Impairment	14 (5.8%)
Physical Health	4 (1.7%)
Diabetes	4 (1.7%)
Stomach Issues	3 (1.3%)

Note: Demographic information such as race, age, and gender were not available to the research team.

Those who do have children, almost half (48%) do not have custody, with 25% having partial custody. Upon intake, the majority of members are unemployed (76%), involved in the court system (69%), were engaged in substance use (55%), and had health insurance (84%). Health concerns ranged from 1 to 7 upon intake assessment, with an average of 2 concerns per person (SD = 1.5). Approximately 45% of members reported stress, 42% reported experiencing trauma, and 37% reported having anger issues. Additionally, approximately a third of members reported experiencing anxiety and having sustained a gunshot wound, respectively. Depression was reported by 18% of members, while 5% reported experiencing emotional impairment. Other reported health conditions included asthma (22%), back pain/injury (12%), high blood pressure (7%), and stomach or physical health issues (3%).

Table 7. Familial Context Among Members 2020 – Quarter 2 2024 (n = 277-284)

Table 7. Familial Context Among Members 202	0 – Quarter 2 2024 (n = 277-284)
Variable	Frequency (%)
Relationship with mother	
None	7 (2.4%)
Poor	22 (7.8%)
Fair	31 (10.9%)
Good	210 (73.9%)
Excellent	5 (1.8%)
Deceased	9 (3.2%)
Relationship with father	
None	24 (8.6%)
Poor	58 (20.8%)
Fair	53 (19.0%)
Good	112 (40.1%)
Excellent	1 (0.4%)
Deceased	31 (11.1%)
Parental Substance Use	63 (22.7%)
Family Criminal History	138 (49.3%)
Current Support System	
Mother only	33 (11.1%)
Father only	3 (1.0%)
Parents	10 (3.3%)
Grandparent(s)	6 (2.0%)
Significant other only	34 (11.5%)
Other family/friends	164 (55.2%)
No support	23 (7.7%)

Table 7 illustrates familial context and current support system for members. Over 72% reported that they had a "good" or "excellent" relationship with their mother and about 10% reported that they didn't have a relationship or had a "poor" relationship with their mother. In contrast, approximately 38% of members reported having a "good" or excellent" relationship with their father. Approximately 39% reported that they had no relationship or a "poor" relationship with their father. Three percent reported that their mother and 10% reported that their father was deceased. Furthermore, over a fifth noted reported parental substance use and nearly half reported they had family with a criminal history. The majority of members (55%) reported that other family or friends as their current support system. Eleven percent received support from their significant other, whereas 11% received support from their mother only. Approximately 6% reported that their current support system was their parents, grandparents, or only their father. Seven percent reported having no current support system.

Table 8. Member Needs 2020 - 2024 (n = 288)

Variable	Frequency (%)
Needs (Range)	0-16
Mean (SD)	5.1 (2.9)
(55)	3 (2.3)
Needs Assessment	
Driver's License	219 (75.8%)
Skills Trade	190 (65.7%)
Job Placement	183 (63.0%)
Mentor	151 (52.9%)
Ticket Assistance	137 (47.4%)
GED	82 (28.4%)
Mental Health Counseling	79 (27.3%)
Job Preparedness	77 (26.6%)
School	52 (18.0%)
Grocery Assistance	49 (17.0%)
State ID	46 (15.9%)
Housing	45 (15.6%)
Legal Services	41 (14.2%)
Tattoo Removal	33 (11.4%)
Interview	29 (10.0%)
Clothes	26 (9.0%)
Substance Abuse Counseling	20 (6.9%)
Family Care Assistance	6 (2.1%)
Household Appliances	5 (1.7%)
Household Furniture	5 (1.7%)
Telephone Bill	4 (1.4%)
Transportation	3 (1.0%)

Note: GED = General Education Development.

Table 8 illustrates reported needs among members. The number of needs reported per member ranged from 0 to 16, with an average of 5 needs per member (SD = 2.9). Over 75% of members reported they needed help obtaining a driver's license. Additionally, 65% of members reported they needed assistance with skills trade training, while 63% reported job placement assistance. Approximately 52% of members reported needing a mentor and nearly 47% reported that they needed ticket assistance. Furthermore, 28% of members reported they needed assistance with General Education Development (GED), 26% reported a need for job preparedness, and roughly 18% needed help with school. Approximately one third of members reported a need for mental health and substance abuse counseling. Seventeen percent of members needed grocery assistance, 15% needed help obtaining a state ID, and 15% reported a need for housing assistance. Additionally, 14% of members reported they needed legal services and 11% requested help with tattoo removal.

Programmatic Activities

This section of the report provides information on Outreach activities across the three pillars (i.e., community intervention, legal services, and mentorship) and custom notifications. Data for the current section derive from their respective Smartsheets. Please see Appendix B for an overview of the Ceasefire Outreach Pillars.

Community Intervention

Table 9 displays the various community interventions that were performed by the Ceasefire team between May 18 and June 26, 2024. The most frequent community intervention activity was a Community Outreach activity which encompassed 82 (70%) events or actions.

Table 9. Community Intervention Activities, May 18, 2024 – June 26, 2024 (n = 117)

Table 3: commandy intervention Activities, may	10/2021 70110 20/2021 (11 111/
Ceasefire Community Intervention	Frequency Percent
Community Outreach	82 (70.1%)
Community Events	30 (36.6%)
Custom Notifications	15 (18.3%)
School Outreach	8 (9.8%)
Call-ins	8 (9.8%)
Agency Engagement	8 (9.8%)
Funeral Support	7 (8.5%)
Peace Walks	3 (3.7%)
Precinct Engagement	3 (3.7%)
Peer Exchange	15 (12.8%)
Shooting Scene Response	9 (7.7%)
Crowd Control	4 (44.4%)
Victim Advocacy/Resource Connection	3 (33.3%)
De-Escalation/Mediation	2 (22.2%)
Victim Hospital Response	9 (7.7%)
Street Engagement	2 (1.7%)
Recent Shooting	2 (100.0%)

Examples of community events included a men's wellness matters event, One Detroit Peacenics, a balloon release, feeding the commons and the homeless, and a Faith Clinic from the Church of God in Christ based on the event name. Additionally, six (75%) of the school outreach events occurred at Pershing High School. There were two school outreach events occurred at the Ser Metro YouthBuild Learning Academy.

Table 10 illustrates the frequencies of where Ceasefire community intervention took place, when identified. There were 33 (28%) community interventions that were missing a ZIP code. Nearly half (46.4%) of the identified interventions occurred in three ZIP codes which were 48213, 48201 and 48205.

Table 10. Community Intervention Activities by ZIP Code (n = 81)

Table 10. Community Intervention Activities by ZIP Code (n = 81)			
ZIP Code	Frequency (%)		
48213	(19) 22.6%		
48201	(10) 11.9%		
48205	(10) 11.9%		
48234	(6) 7.1%		
48219	(5) 6.0%		
48223	(5) 6.0%		
49344	(4) 4.8%		
48224	(3) 3.6%		
48203	(2) 2.4%		
48207	(2) 2.4%		
48216	(2) 2.4%		
48226	(2) 2.4%		
48123	(1) 1.2%		
48206	(1) 1.2%		
48208	(1) 1.2%		
48209	(1) 1.2%		
48210	(1) 1.2%		
48217	(1) 1.2%		
48227	(1) 1.2%		
48228	(1) 1.2%		
48235	(1) 1.2%		
48236	(1) 1.2%		
48340	(1) 1.2%		

Legal Services

Based on unique Member ID's, 20 members received one or more legal services from the Ceasefire Outreach team. Table 11 identifies the legal services activities that were conducted by Ceasefire Outreach.

Table 11. Frequency of Legal Services (n = 59)

Table 110 (requested or 10gail 20 (receipt			
Legal Service Activities	Frequency (%)		
Advocacy and Support	26 (43.3%)		
Legal Assistance	26 (43.3%)		
Court Appearance	23 (88.5%)		
Warrants Cancelled 2 (7.7%)			
Tickets Forgiven	1 (3.8%)		
Legal Education 6 (10.0%)			
Training	4 (66.7%)		
Workshop	2 (33.3%)		
Case Management/Assessment	1 (1.7%)		
Legal Case Plan	1 (100%)		

The most common legal activities were advocacy and support and legal assistance (86.6%). Legal assistance included three subcategories encompassing court appearance, tickets forgiven, and cancellation of warrants. Court appearance was the most frequently reported legal assistance activity (88.5%).

As shown in Figure 6, the majority (61.0%) of legal activities were conducted virtually.

Virtually 39%

In-Person 61%

Figure 6. Modality of Legal Service Support

Mentorship

Finally, Table 12 provides frequencies for the Ceasefire mentorship activities. The majority of all mentorship activities were 1:1 mentoring (61.8%).

Table 12. Frequency of Mentorship Activities (n = 293)

Activity Type	Frequency
1:1 Mentoring	181 (61.8%)
Group Sessions	30 (10.2%)
Member Resource and Support Connection	82 (28.0%)

Custom Notifications

This section reports on custom notifications, both attempted and completed. Data for the current section is derived from the Custom Notification Request Tracker in Smartsheets.

Custom notifications are direct and individualized messages that are delivered to targeted individuals within the community. Targeted individuals are those who have been identified as high-risk for involvement in future violence and/or primary perpetrators of violence in the City of Detroit. These individuals are identified through intelligence gathered by law enforcement agencies and their partners, and information that is shared with Ceasefire Outreach workers. Custom notifications delivered to individuals within the community include several components, including that (1) the levels of violence caused by yourself or your group are unacceptable; (2) given past behaviors and actions, you and your group members are considered high risk for involvement in future violence or victimization; (3) any future violence by you or your group members will result in a targeted law enforcement response, and (4) that outreach workers and social service providers are able and willing to assist you. Due to the various components, the delivery of custom notifications involves a joint effort among members of law enforcement, Ceasefire Outreach Workers, and other social service providers in the city.

From January 4, 2024 to June 26, 2024, there were a total of 256 custom notifications. Of the 256 custom notifications, 169 (66%) included a date and completion information. Table 13 illustrates the frequency of attempted and completed custom notifications by quarter for case with complete data. In quarter 1 2024, 41 (36%) of custom notifications were completed. In quarter 2 2024, 13 (24%) were completed. Overall, nearly a third of custom notifications are completed in 2024.

Table 13. Attempted and Completed Custom Notifications by Quarter, January 4, 2024 - 1000 June 26, 2024 (n = 169)

Jan 10 20/ 202 1 (// //	,		
	Attempted	Completed	Total
Quarter 1	74 (64%)	41 (36%)	115
Quarter 2	41 (76%)	13 (24%)	54
Quarter 3			
Quarter 4			
2024 Total:	115 (68%)	54 (32%)	169

Note: There were 87 custom notifications that had missing information in the date and the completion status and are not included in the table.

Table 14 displays various characteristics of the attempted and completed custom notifications. All of the attempted custom notifications took place in-person, and 90% resulted in no contact being made with the targeted individual. This could reflect a data entry error as "attempted" custom notifications reflect incomplete customs where the message could not be delivered. More than a quarter (27%) of all attempted custom notifications were requested by the 9th precinct. The majority of attempted custom notifications were for individuals who had a carrying a concealed weapon charge (32%) or gang involvement (25%). Comparatively, a total of 55 custom notifications were completed during the 6-month period. Notably, the majority of the completed custom notification resulted with the targeted individual being receptive to the messaging. Three individuals signed up for services with the Outreach team following a custom notification.

Table 14. Characteristics of Custom Notifications by Completion Status (n = 170)

	Attempted (<i>n</i> = 115)	Completed (n = 55)
CN Modality		
In Person	115 (100.0%)	53 (96.4%)
Phone		1 (1.8%)
Missing		1 (1.8%)
CN Reason		
CCW Arrest	37 (32.2%)	14 (25.5%)
Gang Involvement	29 (25.2%)	8 (14.5%)
Shooting Victim	23 (20.0%)	10 (18.2%)
Other	21 (18.3%)	17 (30.9%)
Referral	1 (0.9%)	3 (5.5%)
Link Analysis	1 (0.9%)	1 (1.8%)
Missing	3 (2.6%)	2 (3.6%)
Prior CN		
No	108 (93.9%)	52 (94.5%)
Yes	5 (4.3%)	1 (1.8%)
Missing	2 (1.8%)	2 (3.6%)
CN Outcome		
No Contact Made	104 (90.4%)	1 (1.8%)
Not Receptive	7 (6.1%)	6 (10.9%)
Receptive	1 (0.9%)	38 (69.1%)
Juvenile Receptive		5 (9.1%)
Juvenile Not Receptive		1 (1.8%)
Signed Up		3 (5.4%)
Missing	3 (0.9%)	1 (1.8%)
Requested Precinct		
2	3 (2.6%)	3 (5.5%)
3	3 (2.6%)	
4	10 (8.7%)	7 (12.7%)
5	12 (10.4%)	2 (3.6%)
6	3 (2.6%)	2 (3.6%)
7	15 (13.0%)	5 (9.1%)
8	12 (10.4%)	12 (21.8%)
9	31 (27.0%)	7 (12.7%)
10	1 (0.9%)	4 (7.3%)
11	14 (12.2%)	4 (7.3%)
12	11 (9.6%)	9 (16.4%)
Gun Stat		
0	78 (68.8%)	34 (61.9%)
3	20 (17.4%)	8 (14.5%)
Missing	17 (14.8%)	13 (23.6%)

Approximately 22% of completed custom notifications occurred in the 8th precinct, this is followed by 16% in the 12th precinct. Approximately, 31% of all completed custom notifications were for "other" cause, followed by a charge for carrying a concealed weapon (25%), and being identified as a shooting victims (18%).

Experiences of the Outreach Team

To better understand the experiences of the Outreach Team, previously presented quantitative data are complemented by qualitative focus groups with Outreach staff. Focus groups were conducted between July and September 2024 and focused on perceptions of their roles and responsibilities, challenges, successes, and relationship with criminal justice organizations. Text in the following sections in quotations are comments that were made directly by interviewees during focus groups. To enhance readability and protect participant anonymity quotes were minimally edited (i.e., removed duplicate words, filler words, and potentially identifiable information), without changing their underlying meaning.

Challenges

Each focus group was asked about challenges they encounter in their work. Participants reported a range of challenges in their work, which were categorized into six key areas: instability of the work, systemic barriers, limited resources, mental health and well-being, communicating success, and operating within a focused-deterrence model.

Instability of the Work. The very nature of Outreach was described as being "**two-faced**", where it is pleasant and nice one minute, then the next it is "chaotic and tragic". There is an inherent complexity in navigating different parts of the city and knowing who to talk to and knowing who shouldn't yet be approached. Staff expressed that it is difficult to plan your day not knowing what could happen and that they feel like they're on 24/7. One Outreach worker provides an example of what a day could entail:

"...but you get a call until 11 o'clock at night, and you have to respond. Now, the responses are different because the needs are different, right? So, someone may leave something for work tomorrow, someone may need food, someone may need a place to, you know, move temporarily. So, I think the needs are different, but I think the one constant is the communication with our members and just kind of serving them as much as we can."

Operations are also impacted by the political landscape.

Systemic Barriers. When discussing challenges associated with work, a great deal of emphasis was placed on systemic barriers associated with supporting members and potential members. Structural drivers of violence and trauma are well documented (Armstead et al., 2021; Buggs et al., 2022), Outreach staff's testimonies validate this knowledge base and provide nuances to inform community-based response to violence prevention. Participants frequently noted familial and subculture factors including family dynamics, intergenerational nature of violence, "learned" acceptance of violence, and a lack of positive role models. One participant summarized these thoughts stating: "I think the enabling spirit of the community really harms. Because you don't have enough people there to say 'Nah man you got to do this' [referring to positive change]". Reflecting on their own past, one Outreach workers articulated the intricacies of the one' environment and risk of violence:

"My truest challenge is comprehension of learned behavior, not necessarily the individual that we serve. But once upon a time, the way I used to think I literally thought that my actions were justifiable ... And a lot of times their response is this is what I know. By me, understanding that because once upon a time, I lived my life differently. The challenge is, like I say, getting them to understand that you have help. So, the culture shock that they actually have help a lot of times is the pushback but what I've learned is meeting them where they are and having that experience in my past has allowed me to build relationships and know when I go into a room representing the product, I've been able to build relationships with people to not look at the individual, as a criminal, or as high-risk ... So now the person who I'm trying to service, trying to let them know this is what's possible. And that's very difficult because we're fighting against learned behaviors. And when you come from a particular environment, you're kind of you know, I guess in layman's terms you can you don't know what exists. You don't know that these opportunities exist because you're so programmed to think I'm going to fail or going to jail is acceptable."

The cyclical nature and mentality of violence is challenging to interrupt. As one outreach staff stated, "if you are shot and you are from a particular type of environment, you don't view yourself as a victim". An Outreach worker contextualized the cyclical nature and mentality of violence and the difficulty in changing this mentality:

"... I got shot five times. When they asked me who shot me I said, 'I shot myself.' I said 'you'll find out who shot me when I shoot him back'. And I didn't even know if I was going to die. I went into shock and the speech that I just gave, me and my father got shot 100 feet away from each other. 17 years apart and both almost lost all life literally 100 feet away from where I was born. But I didn't view myself as a victim at the time because of the way that I lived my life. I was shot, stitched up and running the streets looking for people who shot me, that's not how a victim thinks."

Their testimony underscores the challenges in interrupting the cycle of violence and the need to focus on a range of factors, such as environment, family, and mentality.

Limited Resources. Outreach workers consistently expressed difficulties associated with a lack of resources for participants, the community, and the workers themselves. Participants frequently emphasized their experiences encountering individuals who didn't meet the criteria for Ceasefire but were in need of support. One Outreach worker described their desire to support these individuals who weren't gang affiliated but are in need:

"So I think that's one thing that for me in the community, that I think we need to figure out how ceasefire can be more open to people that ain't already been incarcerated or involved in a gang. I know it'll be tough, but that's one thing, if we could do something that I would like to see done, because, like I said, people in the community that love that messed up when they was young, maybe don't have a record, just didn't get off to a great start, and want to get their life back on track. But we can't do nothing with them. Like we can't help. I mean, I can help you, tell you what to do, but I can't offer you these programs that we have"

Participants also highlighted the need from additional support to facilitate their efforts in meetings participants' needs, including support for burial arrangements, clothing for children, housing, food, and additional funds for relocation.

Financial strain was described as undermining Outreach workers' capacity to fully engage in their role and mission of their work. The "contractor" designation resulted in a number of strains for Outreach staff associated with "out of pocket" expenses such as insurance. Emphasis was placed on having to use their personal vehicles for the work without compensation and the nature of the work taking them all over the city:

"We use our personal vehicles for the work, we're all over the city, drop everything, come quick, that type deal. So, like, I mean, we can go gas up for the week and your day is busy for two days, and you're having to fuel right back up the next day. With no compensation. No compensation at all, no mileage. You know, we're contractors, so we pay everything out of pocket. You know, insurance, life insurance, Aflac, all that type of stuff. So resources are very minimal to us, and we're out there in the thick of it, you know? I mean, I'm a single parent. My child is in college, and I sacrifice a whole lot to make sure she has everything she needs. And it's like and this is why we have other things going on, you know."

Others described being unable to sustain their own needs and referenced needing to take on additional jobs in order to have adequate health insurance. Not having paid time off (PTO) or vacation time was associated with both financial strain and burnout. One participant describes the weight of the work and how taking time off to recuperate isn't an option due to financial needs:

"The work gets really heavy, like I remember one summer we had where it was just full of death and shooting like we were burnt out for like a whole week straight, literally seven days, I was at a scene, not a hospital bedside doing a bedside at a scene where the person passed away. And it's like that was every day. This is the summertime. It was everything. Was like, man, we can't catch a break. And it's like, once you try to get that, try to decompress, it's like, I want to take, I need a whole week off to, you know, to power back up. But you can't do that. Try to get it in two days and come back and be at least halfway replenished."

Mental Health and Well-Being. Emphasis was placed on the critical need for expanded health care supports for Outreach workers to best fulfill their roles, a documented need among community violence intervention staff (Lund et al., 2024). Not only did participants express coming to the work with their own exposures to trauma and violence, but they also navigate additional levels of trauma through the inherent risk of their job (Free & MacDonald, 2022; Hureau et al., 2022). One Outreach worker describes the mental and emotional toll the job can have:

"But it weighs on me. I mean, it weighs on me, I'm tired. I'm tired of giving, it weighs on you. Everybody needs therapy. We need to be able to go talk to someone sometimes. And, you know, let our stuff out. You get sick of sin. And no matter if you grew up around or not, there comes a time when you get tired of seeing it. So I think that's one thing that will help is resources for the team in the group, is having someone we can go talk to some days. I've been to the five shooting scenes and three was deadly, and it's affecting me ... I just think we do need someone. We probably can, you know, every once a while, once a month, or whenever you need it, just, hey, look, I need to come in, sit down and just talk. You know, I think everybody have trauma. I think everybody should see a therapist. That's just me. I think, you know, we all got issues."

Participants associated this lack of support, not only for mental health but other job-related benefits such as vacation and health insurance coverage, with the public's perception of outreach and the lack of recognition of Outreach workers as first responders:

"You know, I don't like the fact that they don't recognize this as first responders, and I feel we don't get the same type of treatment. There's the first responders do, but we're sometimes we're first on the scene. They're dealing with the trauma, to deal with the family. And I think that we should be recognized also have the same type of treatment, the benefits and everything that the first responders get."

Determining and Communicating Success. Participants expressed frustration with the necessity of validating of their work through data-driven metrics that predominantly focus on crime rates rather than their transformative work with members. For example, one Outreach workers recounted their interactions with law enforcement and the focus on official crime rates, which isn't capturing their preventive work:

"We working on people, working on their hard time ...but they don't see that work. And this dude finally got a job, or he's finally getting his GED, or he's finally getting his tickets cleared up, that type of work, and we put in our smartsheet now, but I don't think he look at that. He look at the numbers from the precinct like, 'hey, they still shooting over there?' Well, yeah, there are. It probably was four this week when it could have been eight or nine. You know that? That's the thing. They say 'we made 25 arrests'. Well, you could have made about 35 or 40. But because we there, we're trying. We're trying."

Participants believed that success should be measured based on the successes of their members, such as getting a GED or not having contact with law enforcement. It was expressed that "you can't measure success sitting in the office" and staff were concerned that their hard work and the members' progress isn't always captured in Smartsheets, the primary mechanism for reporting on programmatic and participant activities. Subsequently, there was concern that the communication of success would get "watered down" if there was a reliance on case management software and it wasn't coming from the person who experienced it.

Another concern was the comparison of Ceasefire "success" with other community violence intervention (CVI) groups in the city and how this may impact Ceasefire Detroit. Concern was grounded in notable differences between the programs including operating under a different model (i.e., CVI groups don't directly involve law enforcement) and different geographic boundaries (i.e., CVI groups cover what may be equivalent to a neighborhood).

Operating within a Focused-Deterrence Model. The utility of the focused-deterrence model was challenged by participants who believed that Ceasefire should be "community-led or faith-based" rather than led by law enforcement. Concerns were raised regarding the punitive and fear-based nature of call-in meetings. A participant highlights the challenges with the call-in meetings and nuances of its delivery:

"So as a criminal if you sit me in a seat and put a picture on the wall and you're only telling me that I'm going to be the man in the circle in which I'm coming from. So now you fuel my fire to make it on the wall. Now you're asking me to change in front of my peers who are trying to make it up on the wall as well. So now, I'm not going to listen because I'm more afraid to go against the grain of the people I'm sitting with than anything else. Now the people who are offering me help, now the question is as a criminal, how do I respond to that? So now it's about the approach ... Now you've taken me out of my environment, and he put me in a room for two hours. And then say you can change your life in the room with everybody who you idolize. And everything that you know is on the screen. The people are trying to be the person on the screen."

This highlights key concerns with a focused-deterrence ability to break cycle of violence. Outreach also expressed frustration with the approach that "if you don't cooperate, you're a target". In cases where individuals are victims of a shooting and do not cooperate, law enforcement will treat them as a target, causing challenges for Outreach work:

"Detroit would say this is Detroit, and this is how we're doing that. That's caused us problems which we are definitely seeing that right now. Right now! We're dealing with a member right now who has a ton of influence, a ton of influence on the east side. And because he didn't cooperate, he became a target for the Feds. No question. When we could use him. Oh, I mean, he has so much influence and he's willing to work. He's willing to be a part, he's already gone through the process of changing, and because of that, that one piece right now he's a target and he's looking at federal time."

This strains relationships between Outreach workers and members, as members can lose trust in Ceasefire if they associated Outreach with law enforcement. Moreover, this can strain relationships between Outreach and law enforcement as they each seek to address violence but their respective approaches may conflict.

Strengths and Successes

Despite the various challenges that emerged, a range of strengths and successes were reported which were categorized into four key areas: passion for the work, composition of the team, credibility, member accomplishments.

There was a resounding sentiment that everyone was passionate about their work and was invested in the program's mission.

It's all out of love. They don't pay us a whole lot of money. We ain't in there for the money we is in it for the love, to support for these people, support. No, I'm saying so it ain't about no money. We're not making no millions doing this right here. About the love. It's about your passion. You gotta have drive and passion to do this right here. Everybody can't do this.

The composition of the team facilitated their work within the community. Team-based strengths included their ability to adapt as a team, understanding the dynamics of various neighborhoods and groups, trusted relationships with the intelligence community, versatility, and experience. A participant describes how the team makeup allows them to be effective:

"Our dynamics of our team go a long way. A lot of us have good reputations in different areas within combined. I think we have a mighty table, if you would say. And I say that because of different dynamics and different areas that we like, the areas that how grew up, where he covered, or 'John' grew up and he covered, or he grew up he covered. It's not nowhere that we don't go that one of us isn't identified, and we can take the leap, and then that validates who we are with the community, because of how you know, how our reputations precede us in our communities, in different areas, and so it's nowhere throughout the city, no one don't know any one of us on the Ceasefire team. So, at any time, one like he can take the lead and he'll soften everything. So okay, if that's he, then it's okay. So then they'll listen to our message. They'll accept us. Because it's hard certain areas, it's hard to break into. And I think that by our dynamics of our team and the strength of our team, it makes everything easy."

Credibility is fundamental to the success of Outreach. Their capacity to build trust enables them to work directly with those at risk of violence and is essential for effective intervention. This trust allows them to mediate conflicts, prevent retaliatory actions, and promote positive change. While there is no formal definition for "credibility" or "credible messenger", Outreach staff testimonies coincide with previously identified themes of credibility (Szkola & Blount-Hill, 2024). Participants described their credibility as grounded in their lived experiences and personal background, social approval/local rapport, distinct identity, authenticity, and external support. Outreach workers commonly referenced their shared experiences with those they were seeking to work with, such as a former gang affiliation, being incarcerated, losing friends or family members to violence, or living in the same neighborhood. Staff reported that they build trust by being authentic and working in ways to show they really care about their members. For example:

"For me, I called my members and say, 'Hey, let's go to Coney Island. Can you meet?' If theres not a situation where the gang, and I'm worried about somebody coming by, so I told him let's meet here. 'Can we meet lunch?' Let's do lunch and try to just build here. So my thing, we come to the gym. Um, let's talk. So I try to just build my social, my social skills. I like to trust. Like, look, this is who I am. I'm no better than you. You know, I'm just lucky to be on this side. So let me just meet you and say I'm just trying to help you. So for me, I'll build my relationship by phone calls. 'Okay, let's talk. I want to meet you, man, can you meet lunch? On me. We're gonna be at this Coney Island. What's close to you to eat when you go to sit down break bread? Let's talk. See how we get things going.' That's just how I do with my members. When I and if some refuse, I just talk and say, 'well, then what can I do to help?' You know, so for me, that's how I do it for my members."

Outreach staff described their credibility, not just among members, but also among law enforcement and other agencies. With many outreach staff coming having criminal histories, some expressed concerns that justice agencies may not value their work or find them reliable. One participant describes how they were seen as trustworthy among law enforcement and, in turn, this changed their perception of policing:

"It was a felony that I received. I tried to give back. What I've been offered and the deputy chief who now was the deputy mayor was the first person to shake my hand as a police officer. I would have never thought that I will have a legal relationship with a police officer. He shook my hand and he told me I'm not worried about your past, I'm worried about what you do today and then he sent me to get FBI clearance. That was unheard of to me, and it made me look at policing differently which made me in turn, want to teach something different"

Finally, the team has worked diligently to create a distinct identity from law enforcement while simultaneously collaborating with them on certain efforts, such as custom notifications and call-ins. This distinction is crucial given the "adversarial relationship that's kind of built into [the] community" between police and residents. The Ceasefire Outreach "reputation precedes" them in the community:

"I think when they see the Ceasefire brand, it is amazing some of the questions now that we get asked, some of the requests. "Hey, man can Oh, my aunt gotta move from over there." You know, so I think when they see ceasefire, I think if you had to summarize it in one word, is help. Yeah, I think when they see us, they feel the love, but they know. They're going to provide us with some help. And that's what we've been doing. I think that's what makes us effective."

Altruism

A theme that emerged throughout the focus groups was altruistic behavior among the Outreach Team. This behavior is exemplified by Outreach staff who use their own money or personal resources to support an Outreach member of community member. For example:

"It's Halloween. We head up to a scene at the hospital. It is in total disarray. It's total chaos. And you know, there are young kids out there because again, crime has no organized or determined time. So, they got kids out there in their Halloween costumes, all of this. And we're sitting there and we've kind of gotten the crowd kind of calm. He kind of looks at all the children, and we look they don't have any candy. We walk across the street to the store. Just go get as much candy as we could out of CVS, whatever was there and we walked back. And we provide those young, young people with candy."

Other instances of altruism include getting diapers for a member's child, donating clothes, ending vacations short to make a meeting for a member, raising money for families who lost someone to gun. These actions are also viewed as giving the Outreach team credibility and building trust within the community.

Complex Relationship with Police

Another theme that emerged during the focus groups was the complexity of relationship between Outreach and law enforcement. Outreach has a balancing act to perform, where they work with law enforcement and simultaneously service a community that doesn't always trust the police. Several Outreach staff noted that they have a good relationship with law enforcement and there is a mutual respect between them, particularly with street officers. One Outreach worker described how Outreach can support law enforcement in de-escalation and ultimately individuals who may have become legally involved:

"Yeah, good. I mean, they respect us, especially the day-to-day officers, the street officers. They respect us, and we have good I mean, we know a lot of them, we see on those scenes. I'm saying they respect the work we do, because it makes it easy for them because a lot of times we intervene before they have to. If they have to, they got to work. Yeah? So, we've done things that I've gotten the guy at the backseat of a police car and sent him home where we've had officers were engaging gang members, and we were there and some of our guys because they knew the gang members were able to intervene and talk to the gang members and get them to, you know, stand down and return, get the police to stand down so we didn't have a big issue, you know, and that. So the relationship with the police, the street officers are great."

Law enforcement will send Outreach referrals and, in the past, Outreach would receive calls from gang intelligence regarding relevant incidents but those are now "few and far between". Others noted that the transition to the Health Department made them more "vulnerable" and now the relationship between Outreach and law enforcement is regulated to custom notifications.

Ceasefire Outreach has sometimes had illustrate the distinction between themselves and the police. Participants noted that this doesn't happen often but is easily addressed when it does. Ultimately some individuals do not want to be apart of the program because it is connected with the police. Additionally, Outreach staff reported that there is not always agreement in who is an "issue" and it can be challenging to stand up to law enforcement or criminal justice actors regarding "targets". While Outreach staff noted that they often get referrals from call-in meetings, they don't think they "get a lot of bang for [their] buck with customs" and people are more apprehensive hearing the law enforcement message.

Improvements

Overall, Outreach workers expressed their passion and dedication to the job but offered several potential improvements. This includes:

- The program taking a community-led approach
- Using a holistic approach that encompasses additional supports for families, especially parents and intervening early on
- Clarifying criteria for hiring, led by people who are currently doing the work
- Incorporating prevention early on in schools
- Additional resources for Outreach staff (e.g., company vehicles, insurance, mental health support, therapy)
- Additional resources for individuals who don't meet Ceasefire criteria but are in need

One participant highlighted the need to change the perception surrounding Outreach and, subsequently, the support given to those in the position:

"I would make the outreach workers more so like the community health workers and be treated, like he said earlier, like first responders. You know, I'm saying, because we are so, we need to be respected more so on that level than anything else, and be treated as such. The pay needs to be different, because ain't nobody making no real living off of this money that benefits whatever. You know, something happened to us, and we got here trying to take care of everybody else, take care of our family, but we shifted this east part. Gotta go to my house and do same thing. And I'm saying so we got to be treated and respected as such as and everybody should be given, you know, we should be treated like community health workers"

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

The current study sought to explore trends in enrollments and referral sources, participant characteristics, programmatic activities, and experiences among Outreach workers. By doing so, the findings can enhance the operation and effectiveness of the Ceasefire Detroit program. As noted above, Ceasefire is a strategy for reducing levels of gang and group violence that has received support in prior research. It is also a strategy that requires coordination across local, state, and federal agencies; continual identification of high-risk groups and individuals; violence interruption/outreach efforts; community-partnerships; and more. Framed by the action research model, the current study sought to examine the scope of Detroit Outreach, a complementary prevention mechanism to Ceasefire Detroit. Prior research suggests that these complementary mechanisms can support the efficacy of focused deterrence strategies. A better understanding of the mechanisms through which these violence interrupters/outreach workers engage with high-risk individuals and the community at large will inform how to assess their impact on violence.

The current study examined the scope of activities performed by the Ceasefire Outreach Team, characteristics of Outreach members and insight into outreach staff's experiences. This is presented in the context of violent crime trends in Detroit, Michigan. Since 2020, violence has decreased in Detroit; however, the need for violence reduction efforts in Detroit continues.



The Outreach Team engages in a wide range of activities including community-based events (e.g., peace walks), street-based engagement (e.g., shooting response), direct work with Outreach members, work with law enforcement (e.g., custom notification), and youth engagement. Much of their work is collaborative, working with service providers, law enforcement, faith-based organizations, community organizations, and more. Since 2020, there have been an average of 62 intakes per year. From 2016-2019, the majority of referrals were from a call-in meeting (61%). From 2020-2023, referrals from call-in meetings accounted for 24% of all referrals. This could be reflective of pandemic era restrictions and a reduced number of call-in meetings. However, from 2020 - June 2024, referral sources have diversified compared to prior years. It appears as though the Outreach Team is reaching its intended population. Nearly half (47%) of members have less than a high school degree or equivalent, approximately 10% of members reported that their father was deceased and 38% had no relationship or a poor relationship with their father. Nearly half of members reported that a family member had a criminal history. This was reinforced by qualitative data where outreach staff reported a lack of role models for many members.

The outreach workers' programmatic activities play a critical role in fostering community, building trust, and supporting individuals at heightened risk of involvement in violence. Their work not only bridges gaps between communities and resources but also serves as a vital mechanism for de-escalating conflict and providing opportunities for positive change. The recent reorganization of outreach activities has proven instrumental in enhancing tracking. By establishing clearer structures and defined processes, the reorganization has improved the ability to monitor individual progress and community-level impact. This systematic approach ensures that outreach workers can more effectively identify high-risk individuals, tailor their interventions, and track outcomes over time.

The evidence gathered throughout this evaluation highlights the value of outreach work within the focused deterrence framework. By continuing to refine programmatic activities and leveraging data-driven approaches, outreach workers can sustain their critical contributions to violence prevention and community well-being.

An essential component of this evaluation was engaging directly with the outreach staff to gather insights into their experiences. Their firsthand perspectives were invaluable in understanding the program's challenges, strengths, and successes, as well as identifying opportunities for improvement. These discussions provided a nuanced view of the day-to-day realities of outreach work and shed light on the complexities of their roles. Outreach staff shared candid reflections on the obstacles they encounter, ranging from resource limitations to the intricacies of building trust within communities. They also highlighted the program's strengths, such as their deep commitment to the work, their ability to form meaningful connections with individuals at risk, and the tangible successes they have achieved in reducing violence and fostering positive change.

Beyond operational insights, the outreach workers offered additional perspectives that enriched our understanding of their altruistic motivations. Their dedication stems from a genuine desire to uplift their communities and guide individuals toward safer, more productive paths. However, these discussions also revealed the complex relationship they navigate with law enforcement. While their work often requires collaboration, it also necessitates maintaining credibility and trust within communities that may view law enforcement with skepticism. This balancing act underscores the unique position outreach workers occupy and the critical importance of their role. These conversations not only informed the evaluation but also reinforced the value of incorporating outreach workers' voices in program development and refinement. Their lived experiences and insights are vital to ensuring that outreach efforts remain effective, responsive, and impactful.

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Recommendations

- O1 Collect comprehensive data on linkage to services, initiation of service, and completion of services among participants.
 - A core element of Outreach is the connection of participants to services to address unmet needs. Current tracking of these domains is a limitation of the current evaluation in better understanding participants' progress in service utilization and other participant outcomes (e.g., housing, employment). It is recommended that the case manager collect comprehensive data on linkage to services, initiation of services, and completion of services to better understand the progress of program participants and how that may be correlated to recidivism. This includes their progress towards personal goals identified at intake.
- **O2** Expand the amount of information collected by case managers to include metrics such as quality of life.
 - Outreach participants face many challenges and receive a wide range of support from Outreach workers (e.g., mentorship, legal assistance, skill training). It is important to assess progress across multiple domains, not just engagement in services/Outreach. Collecting quality of life information would better inform care navigation and, perhaps, capture more person-centered changes that arise from the range of supports they receive.
- O3 Consider additional metrics to assess the impact of mentorship.
 - The majority of members (61%) participated in 1:1 mentorship. Moreover, in qualitative interviews, Outreach staff noted the importance of building trust and providing guidance for members. Research shows that relationships with caring adults can positively influence young people's behaviors and decrease risk for involvement in crime and violence (Cheng et al., 2008). To the extent possible, it would be helpful to measure behaviors (e.g., risk behavior, service utilization) or perceptions (e.g., attitudes toward violence) that are expected to change through mentorship.

- **O4** Establish criteria for who is considered an "active" Outreach member.
 - The nature of the Outreach means that engagement in the Outreach Team is solely based on the participant's motivation/desire to engage. This is likely associated with variation in engagement among participants, such as those who may complete an intake and have no further contact with an Outreach worker. We recommend establishing criteria for what is considered an "active" and "inactive" participant. Establishing these criteria may free up time for the Outreach workers to work with participants who are more actively engaged in the program.

O5 Clearly define youth based activities.

• In focus groups, participants noted their interactions with youth and their presence in schools. Engaging with juveniles requires a distinct approach due to their developmental differences compared to adults. Adolescents are in a critical stage of physical, cognitive, and emotional growth, which influences their decision-making and behavior. Additionally, legal guardians play a significant role in the lives of juveniles, necessitating clear boundaries and collaboration with families. Furthermore, programs serving youth must navigate legal and ethical limitations on their scope of services. By clearly defining their work and engagement practices, the program can ensure that it operates within these parameters while providing developmentally appropriate and effective support to juveniles.

06 Expand support for Outreach workers.

- In qualitative interviews, a common challenge was the restrictions that come with being a contractor (e.g., no reimbursement for mileage, less than ideal insurance options). Many noted that this impeded on their capacity to do perform their role, since they may be working part-time at another employer for the benefits.
- Annual end of the year surveys of Outreach Workers may be beneficial to help Detroit Ceasefire's leadership understand the needs of Outreach Workers and their overall experiences as contract workers which can assist with retention.
- An emerging theme from the focus groups was the need for increased funding for Ceasefire members and Outreach Workers. Increased funding can help Ceasefire Detroit expand the number of resources offered to members and those in the community and expand support for Outreach Workers.

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Appendix A

Ceasefire Outreach Focus Group Protocol

Purpose: To gauge Outreach workers' perceptions of their roles and responsibilities, challenges, successes, credibility, relationship with criminal justice organizations (e.g., law enforcement).

Participants: Focus groups will consist of approximately 3-7 Ceasefire Detroit outreach workers and support staff (e.g., administrators).

Recruitment: Recruitment emails will be distributed to all outreach workers and support staff. Focus groups will be advertised during workgroup meetings.

Incentive: No incentives will be provided.

Facilitation: All participants will receive a consent form and verbally consent to participate in the study. They will then complete a short survey providing sociodemographic information. Focus groups will be conducted in-person and will last approximately 60-90 minutes. Focus group interviews will be audio recorded. The privacy of individuals' records will be protected through the use of BitLocker, an encryption software used to safeguard the data. Information will be kept on a password protected computer, in a locked office. The facilitator will pose questions to the group, allowing everyone a chance to respond before moving on to the next question. While questions may vary slightly, the main topics of discussion are as follows:

Topic #1: Background and Motivation

- Can you tell me about your background and how you became an outreach worker?
- What kind of training did you receive for this position?
- What motivated you to take this role?

Topic #2: Daily Activities

- What does a typical day look like for you?
- What are some of the common situations you encounter?
- How do you identify and approach individuals or groups who are at risk of violence?

Topic #3: Challenges and Risks

- What are the biggest challenges you face in your work?
- How do you handle personal safety concerns while on the job?

Topic #4: Impact and Successes

- How do you measure the success of your work?
- What impact do you believe your work has on the community?

Topic #5: Collaboration and Community

- How do you collaborate with criminal legal organizations, such as law enforcement?
- What role does the community have in your work?
- How do you build trust with individuals and communities you work with?
- What makes you "credible" among the people you work with?

Topic #6: Future and Improvement

- What advice would you give someone who is considering becoming an outreach worker?
- What changes would you like to see in community violence intervention (CVI) work?

Appendix B

Ceasefire Program Pillars

MENTORSHIP	COMMUNITY INTERVENTION	LEGAL AID SERVICES
Member Engagement/Assessment 1-on-1 Mentoring Connecting Members to Resources and Service Providers	Custom Notifications Individual violence intervention strategies offered to known gang affiliates	Case Management/ Assessment Assessment of legal needs and development of individualized case plan
Group Sessions Character Building Conflict Resolution Training Emotional Intelligence Training Life Skills Training	Call-Ins ■ Collaborative approach to encourage known gang/group affiliates to stop the violence	Legal Assistance ■ Guidance on legal procedures, rights, and available resources
Member Support Services Mental Health/Substance Abuse Support Detroit Mental Health Authority Team Wellness	Street Engagement Peace Walks Community Awareness	Legal Education Workshops and training sessions Violence prevention, victim rights, and legal resources
Employment and Educational Services /Opportunities Resume Building Career Readiness Interview Training Union Carpenter and Mill Rights Skill Trade	Community Outreach Community Events School Outreach Partnering with Local Organizations	Community Outreach Collaborate with legal aid organizations, law enforcement agencies, service providers, and healthcare professionals Promote Legal Literacy
 Detroit at Work Basic Needs Support Food Transportation Diapers Supportive Housing Emergency Relocation 	Shooting Scene Response Preventing Retaliation Police Community Liaison Victim Advocacy Community Police Response to Victims of Violence (CPRVV) Victim Hospital Response Bedside Support	Advocacy & Support Liaison between members, community organizations, and legal professionals Advocate for members' rights, safety, and well-being within the legal system