



DETROIT PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS: FINAL PROJECT REPORT

DETROIT PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS: FINAL PROJECT REPORT

Edmund F. McGarrell, Ph.D.

Giovanni Circo, M.A.

Jason Rydberg, Ph.D.

Michigan Justice Statistics Center
School of Criminal Justice
Michigan State University

November 2015

This project was supported by Grant No. 2012-GP-BX-0011 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Michigan Justice Statistics Center

The School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University, through the Michigan Justice Statistics Center, serves as the Statistical Analysis Center (MI-SAC) for the State of Michigan. The mission of the Center is to advance knowledge about crime and justice issues in the state of Michigan while also informing policy and practice. The Center works in partnership with the Michigan State Police, Michigan's State Administering Agency (SAA), as well as with law enforcement and criminal justice agencies serving the citizens of Michigan.

For further information see: <http://cj.msu.edu/programs/michigan-justice-statistics-center/>

About the Authors

Edmund F. McGarrell is Director and Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. He also is Director of the Michigan Justice Statistics Center that serves as the Statistical Analysis Center for the state of Michigan. McGarrell's research focuses on communities and crime with a specific focus on violence prevention and control. Recent articles appear in *Crime and Delinquency*, *Criminology and Public Policy*, *Journal of Criminal Justice* and *Journal of Experimental Criminology*.

Giovanni Circo is a doctoral student in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University. He has worked on several federally-funded grants, including the ongoing Detroit Ceasefire program. His research interests include gun violence and program evaluation.

Jason Rydberg is an assistant professor of criminology and justice studies at the University of Massachusetts - Lowell. Until recently, he served as a research assistant with the Michigan Justice Statistics Center at Michigan State University. His research interests concern the evaluation of criminal justice program and policies, particularly in the areas of prisoner reentry, community supervision, and sex offender management. His research has recently appeared in *Criminology and Public Policy*, *Justice Quarterly*, and *Homicide Studies*.

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods: Final Project Report*

Edmund F. McGarrell, Ph.D.

Giovanni Circo, M.A.

Jason Rydberg, Ph.D.

Michigan Justice Statistics Center

School of Criminal Justice

Michigan State University

November 2015

*This project was supported by Grant No. 2012-GP-BX-0011 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2
Description of Detroit PSN	3
<i>Context</i>	3
Evaluation Methods	11
<i>Analysis of Crime Data and Statistics</i>	11
<i>Synthetic Control Model</i>	15
Conclusion	19
<i>Summary of Findings</i>	20
<i>Lessons Learned and Implications</i>	21
References	23

Executive Summary

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), known as the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Partnership, involved a multi-agency collaboration of local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies, community partners, and a research partner following a data-driven strategic effort to reduce gun and gang violence. The strategy combined focused enforcement with youth outreach and intervention. Detroit PSN focused on two high violent crime precincts on the westside of Detroit (6th and 8th precincts).

Participants in the PSN/CVRP expressed consensus that the initiative resulted in enhanced communication and coordination among partnering agencies resulting in enhanced capacity to proactively address gun- and gang-related violence. There was clear evidence of significant activities as a result of PSN including long-term investigations and prosecution of violent street groups; prosecution of chronic violent offenders; probation and parole compliance checks; directed police patrols in gun hotspots; school-based prevention; and community engagement.

Gun crime trends suggested declines in overall gun crime with the most apparent effect on armed robbery. The bottom line is that the level of gun crime victimization declined in the target area, particularly in 2014 after PSN was fully operational (-17%). The difficulty is in interpreting the extent to which these declines in gun violence were attributable to PSN. The citywide data showed similar declines in gun violence that began earlier than the declines observed in the PSN target area. Thus, it is an open question of whether various initiatives such as COMPSTAT, Detroit One, MSP directed patrols, MDOC utilization of field agents and joint compliance checks, Ceasefire, improved economic conditions, or other factors were affecting citywide gun crime trends. It is impossible to clarify whether PSN contributed to the City's overall decline or whether the PSN target area benefitted from these broader forces.

The most persuasive evidence of a PSN gun crime reduction impact came from a comparison with “synthetic control areas”. The synthetic controls were constructed by identifying police scout car areas most similar to the 6th and 8th precincts. This comparison indicated that in 2014 the PSN target area experienced a 9 percent decline in gun crime when compared to the most similar areas of Detroit. When coupled with the very positive reports from PSN/CVRP team members, this suggests that PSN had a positive impact on the capacity of the partnering agencies and on gun crime in the 6th and 8th precincts.

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods: Final Project Report

Since its inception in 2001-02, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) has represented a U.S. Department of Justice strategy for addressing gun and gang violence at the local, state, and Tribal levels (U.S. Department of Justice, 2001; Dalton, 2002). The PSN model has advocated strategic problem solving to tailor strategies to local violent crime problems; support highly focused interventions; and combine enforcement, intervention, prevention, and community building. Both national (McGarrell et al., 2010) and local evaluations (e.g., Braga, 2008; Hipple, 2010; McGarrell and Bynum, 2010; Papachristos et al., 2007) have yielded positive findings suggesting that focused PSN strategies, particularly when implemented with intensity and fidelity, can result in lower rates of gun crime and victimization.

Detroit Project Safe Neighborhoods builds on this model by combining focused enforcement with youth outreach and intervention. Detroit PSN focused on two high violent crime precincts on the westside of Detroit (6th and 8th precincts). The following report provides an overview of the Detroit PSN model, description of major activities, assessment of impact on violent crime, and lessons learned.

Description of Detroit PSN

Context

Detroit has witnessed economic challenges and long-term population loss. From its peak population of 1.8 million in 1950, the population fell to just under 1 million in 2000 with continuing declines resulting in just under 700,000 residents in 2013. Population decline and business losses have resulted in loss of local tax base resulting in reduced resources for a variety of city services including public safety. The population loss has also resulted in abandoned properties in many parts of the city. The macro-economic forces have produced a significant number of neighborhoods facing chronic disadvantage and crime problems. Detroit is consistently ranked among the U.S. cities with the most serious violent crime rates. For example, in 2013 Detroit experienced 316 murders and 14,504 violent crimes. This resulted in murder and violent crime rates of 45 and 2,072 per 100,000 residents compared to national rates of 4.5 and 318, respectively (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015).

Reducing levels of violent crime is recognized by city and criminal justice officials as a key component of revitalization efforts. Recent years have witnessed significant efforts to revitalize the downtown and midtown areas of the city and to develop highly focused public safety and crime prevention and control efforts in various parts of the city. Detroit PSN was designed as part of this overall strategy. Detroit PSN focused on the city's westside in two police precincts with high levels of gun and gang violence. Specifically, Detroit PSN focused on police precincts 6 and 8.

Detroit PSN Model

Detroit PSN followed the core component of the national PSN program. This included establishing local-state-federal criminal justice partnerships, community partnerships, and a

research partnership; strategic planning and an ongoing problem solving approach; training; and focused enforcement.

Partnerships

Detroit PSN was organized around a task force known as the Comprehensive Violence Reduction Partnership (CVRP). It included an over-arching steering committee comprised of the following agencies:

- Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, (ATF);
- Children's Aid Society (fiscal agent)
- Dearborn Police Department
- Detroit Police Department (DPD)
- Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
- Michigan State Police (MSP)
- Michigan State University (MSU; research partner)
- US Attorney's Office (USAO)
- US Marshals, (USMS)
- Wayne County Sheriff's Office (WCPO)
- Wayne County Prosecutor's Office (WCPO)

The CVRP also included an enforcement task force comprised of the above law enforcement agencies. The law enforcement committee met weekly to review gun- and gang-crime trends and to plan investigations and enforcement actions. The USAO and WCPO also included prosecutors that jointly screened cases.

Partnerships were also established with the schools as well as community groups and businesses. The partnership with the schools was built around a gun-crime prevention program. The principal community involved Dearborn Police Department's neighborhood safety seminars and a technology based information sharing system. One of the key business partnerships involved a mall sitting in the border area of Dearborn and Detroit.

Problem Being Addressed/Problem Diagnosis

The initial problem diagnosis was based on data provided by the DPD. Hotspot maps (e.g., see Figures 1 and 2) demonstrated a significant concentration of gun violence in specific geographic areas of the 6th and 8th precincts. These hotspot areas were also known for their gang activities, including a number of gangs involved in drug distribution. Review of gun crime cases revealed three primary correlates of gun crime incidents: gang/group affiliations, victims and offenders with extensive criminal histories, and concentrations in specific hotspot areas within the 6th and 8th precincts. The CVRP enforcement team also implemented an ongoing intelligence-led approach whereby members of the enforcement team de-briefed arrestees held in the precinct's booking facilities.

Figure 1
Gun Related Incidents in District 8
3/2/14 to 10/26/14





Figure 2

**Gun Related Incidents in District 6
3/2/14 to 10/26/14**



The initial analysis and ongoing intelligence gathering was supported by several other intentional efforts to assess gun crime patterns and trends. As will be discussed subsequently, a violent crime task force consisting of federal, state, and local enforcement agencies launched major investigations and enforcement actions against key, violent street groups. These investigations also yielded intelligence that helped shape CVRP strategies. Detroit implemented the Detroit One program. Detroit One is a chronic violent offender program that seeks to prioritize limited enforcement and prosecution resources on the most violent individuals in Detroit. The CVRP placed suspects on the Detroit One list and prioritized Detroit One individuals for investigation. Finally, the MSU research partner (RP) team increasingly provided timely analyses for CVRP including weekly reports on gun crime incidents, crime mapping, and specialized analyses as requested by CVRP. This activity largely occurred during the last 15 months of the PSN project as DPD's information system increasingly supported ongoing analyses by the RPs.

The strategic intelligence continued to support the role of violent street groups, chronic violent offenders, and hotspot locations as the drivers of gun violence in the 6th and 8th precincts. The more timely intelligence provided more tactical intelligence that the CVRP used to focus investigations and enforcement action.

Nature and Basis of Intervention

The Detroit PSN initiative prioritized focused enforcement supported by youth prevention and community building efforts. The enforcement strategy focused on long-term investigations of key violent street groups; investigations focused on Detroit One chronic violent offenders; hotspot patrols and enforcement; coordinated parole/probation-police compliance checks; and coordinated federal-state prosecution. This combination of highly focused people- and place-based strategies have been supported in prior PSN- and related-research (e.g., Braga et al., 2012; Bynum et al., 2006; McGarrell et al., 2001, 2010; McGarrell and Bynum, 2010; National Research Council, 2004; Sherman and Rogan, 1995). As the RP team became equipped to provide more timely information, the enforcement strategy became somewhat similar to Los Angeles Police Department's Project Laser (Uchida and Swatt, 2013). This involved identifying hotspot locations and chronic violent offenders in and around the hotspots for highly focused ("laser") investigations and enforcement. Following principles of Smart Prosecution (Decker et al., 2006), the USAO and WCPO provided dedicated prosecutors to screen gun-crime cases and determine which cases should be prosecuted federally or locally.


The prime prevention strategy involved offer Project Sentry in Detroit public schools serving the westside. Project Sentry is an evidence-informed strategy built on PSN strategies as well as programs such as the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program. The program seeks to educate youths about the consequences of gun violence. These include medical, legal, and social costs of gun violence with the curriculum delivered by law enforcement, medical professionals, social services professionals, educators, community representatives, and peers. The sharing of information is coupled with skits, role playing, and conflict resolution training.

As noted above, Dearborn Police Department also included significant community outreach through safety seminars, a technology-based information sharing network, and a partnership with a mall that historically experienced an increase in crime during the fall/winter holiday season.

The mall crime prevention strategy targeted the high crime seasonal pattern and involved police collaboration with mall security and businesses.

Figure 3 presents the logic model that served translated the problem analysis and goals to strategies and outcomes. The logic model focused on the strategies applied in the 6th and 8th precincts that are the basis for the evaluation.

**FIGURE 3
DETROIT PSN LOGIC MODEL**




Detroit PSN Timeline, Activities, and Accomplishments

Detroit PSN was delayed in implementation due to a variety of contextual factors. The national recession was particularly felt in Detroit. In spring 2012, about the same time PSN Detroit was ready for implementation, the Mayor and City Council entered into agreement with the Governor for fiscal oversight. Eventually this resulted in appointment of an emergency manager and bankruptcy filing in spring-summer 2013. The impact on Detroit PSN was that the PSN contract approval by city government was significantly delayed. Consequently, PSN implementation was delayed.

As Figure 4 shows, implementation began in the second half of 2012. In addition to reviewing gun crime patterns and trends the enforcement team conducted debriefings in the precinct holding facilities. This resulted in investigation leads and initial enforcement strategies. One of the first groups identified by CVRP, ATM, was the result of an investigation of a pharmacy robbery. A second violent street group, BCB, was similarly identified for investigation. These two groups represented the first of several violent street groups targeted by CVRP. In addition to these group investigations, the CVRP implemented targeted enforcement actions in the 6th and 8th precincts.

Figure 4
Project Safe Neighborhoods Detroit, Key Enforcement Activities



The MDOC parolee and probationer checks also were implemented during this period. The CVRP experienced near immediate positive feedback from the compliance checks as several yielded multi-weapons seizures, including firearms with obliterated serial numbers, arrests related to a heroin distribution network, and several defendants faced with federal prosecution.

These strategies continued through the first half of 2013. Investigations were launched that resulted in federal indictments of three additional violent street groups in the second half of 2013. These groups associated with Detroit’s northwest-side included ATL, TMC, and the Vice Lords (VL). The TMC (“too much cash”) investigation was triggered by the robbery of a gun store in Southfield, Michigan, a suburb of Detroit. Twenty-two guns were stolen in the robbery with four later used in three crimes by members of TMC. This resulted in multiple arrests of TMC members. The ATL (“arab thug lordz”) investigation resulted in federal charges for a

criminal enterprise with six members charged federally. The VL investigation resulted in four individuals facing federal indictments. Additional arrests of chronic violent offenders resulted in both federal and state charges and included individuals believed to be involved in multiple shootings and homicides.

The first half of 2014 saw similar enforcement activities with two additional groups targeted for CVRP investigations and additional federal indictments of VL members. These investigations resulted in federal indictments of members of the BHB and RTM street groups. The BHB investigation was noteworthy as it included federal Racketeer and Corrupt Organization (RICO), murder, and drug distribution charges involving nine members. The RTM investigation resulted in three federal indictments with the investigation continuing. The MDOC home compliance checks once again yielded firearms and federal indictments.

As noted, the RTM investigation continued in the second half of 2014 with additional federal indictments. Two additional violent street groups, unnamed due to ongoing investigations, were targeted during this period and into 2015.

During the first half of 2015, several of the ongoing investigations of violent street groups culminated in significant prosecutions at both federal and state levels. Eleven members of one of these groups were indicted federally on a variety of violent crime and firearms charges. Five members of the ATM group were indicted federally, as were five members of RTM. Five defendants from a pill distribution network and involved in a series of shootings were arrested and prosecuted in a case in state court. Two members of the Band Crew were prosecuted in state court for charges including assault with intent to commit murder and firearms charges. MDOC home compliance checks resulted in four additional federal indictments.

The third quarter of 2015 witnessed five members of VL arrested and charged with federal racketeering charges. An additional federal indictment of eight members of Band Crew was announced in September 2015. Charges were based on gang-related homicides, shootings, and robberies.

Interviews with members of the CVRP reported an unprecedented level of cooperation, coordination, and information sharing among the CVRP enforcement partners. Many believed that the targeted group enforcement actions would not have been possible absent the local, state, and federal partnerships established by Detroit PSN, the CVRP, and the violent crime task force.

As described above, the primary prevention activity involved the Project Sentry educational program in Detroit west-side schools. This program began in the second half of 2012 with approximately 500 youths attending this educational program. This level of programming was relatively stable until the first half of 2014 when over 2000 youths participated, peaking at over 2300 in the first half of 2015.

Table 1 summarizes some of the key metrics reflecting Detroit PSN activities. These should be considered conservative estimates. The nature of the multi-agency partnership makes tracking these output measures difficult. Changes in personnel in various agencies resulted in spotty reporting at certain times throughout the project and it is often difficult to disentangle results that

occurred due to routine enforcement activities as opposed to Detroit PSN/CVRP-specific activities. Additionally, these metrics do not include significant enforcement and community outreach activities of Dearborn Police Department that occurred outside of DPD’s 6th and 8th precincts. These metrics displayed in Table 1 reflect this more conservative approach to counting PSN activities. As the data indicate, Detroit PSN has witnessed significant enforcement activity as well as youth outreach.

Table 1
Key PSN Metrics

Felony arrests	Gun Seizures	MDOC Compliance Checks	Estimated value narcotics seizures	Project Sentry Youth Participants	Gun case reviews
273	230	1548	\$2.4 mil	6685	1551

Evaluation Methods

The PSN Research Partner Team concentrated on two main activities. The first was to conduct ongoing problem analyses that could be provided to the CVRP enforcement team. These included weekly summaries of gun crime incidents, crime maps, and periodic customized analyses (e.g., probationer/parolee address mapping). The routine problem analyses became more common during 2014 and 2015 and included weekly or bi-weekly contacts with the enforcement team. This interaction was beneficial from an evaluation perspective because it provided regular updates on PSN activities. Related to these activities were quarterly PSN task meetings that provided updates from all PSN partners.

The second main activity was the evaluation of Detroit PSN. Given limited resources, the focus was on examining the impact of PSN on crime trends in the PSN target area (6th and 8th precincts). This included the tracking of activities as described in prior sections and the subsequent impact analyses. Resource constraints precluded impact analysis of Dearborn Police Department activities as well as the school-based Youth Outreach programs.

Analysis of Crime Data and Statistics

Data were collected from DPD’s internal crime feed system and were disaggregated by offense type, police precinct, and date of occurrence. The 2014 police precinct boundaries were used to group incidents to either the entire city or the PSN target area. Police precincts 6 and 8 were used for the PSN boundaries. Unique crime incidents in which a firearm was used were included for these analyses. These incident types included aggravated assaults with a gun, armed robberies, and gun homicides.

An analysis of the overall combined gun incidents for the study period revealed some notable trends. Overall, between January of 2010 and June of 2015, the city (excluding the PSN target area) experienced an overall decrease in the number of gun-related incidents (see Table 2). The rate of change for the rest of the city ranged from a 15.07% decrease in 2014 to a 0.21% decrease in 2013. Comparatively, the PSN target area experienced somewhat similar, but not entirely consistent, decreases in gun crime (See Table 3). Both 2012 and 2013 saw small to moderate increases in gun-related crime. However, the PSN target area saw a 16.81% decrease in gun-related in crime in 2014 - slightly higher than the rest of the city during the same period. This is consistent with reports from PSN team members and activity tracking that the PSN enforcement activities increased in coordination and intensity in the second half of 2013 and continued in 2014 and 2015.

Table 2 Gun Crimes - Rest of City (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)


YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	466	344	354	475	487	477	552	563	527	453	406	395	5499	-
11	378	258	363	381	475	494	567	543	439	420	434	474	5226	-4.96%
12	386	293	354	365	439	446	546	544	446	489	423	429	5160	-1.26%
13	422	344	330	340	495	546	464	572	475	465	356	340	5149	-0.21%
14	315	231	279	308	373	364	453	497	446	397	326	384	4373	-15.07%
15	270	185	272	324	385	406	-	-	-	-	-	-	1842	-1.50%

Table 3 Gun Crimes - PSN Area (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	121	68	108	111	129	99	134	132	123	114	124	104	1367	-
11	94	66	94	98	118	106	120	124	101	114	102	144	1281	-6.29%
12	93	78	86	128	115	121	164	126	136	109	122	140	1418	10.69%
13	114	80	90	108	144	152	181	161	122	107	119	103	1481	4.44%
14	93	53	80	88	138	113	125	137	115	105	91	94	1232	-16.81%
15	92	61	95	87	108	109	-	-	-	-	-	-	552	-2.30%

Figure 5 shows the overall trend in gun crimes in the rest of the city and the PSN region. The Figure reveals that the PSN target area had experienced an increase in gun crime in 2011. Indeed, this was one of the reasons for the selection of this target area. From that point, the smoothed trend lines for both the city and the PSN target area show an overall declining trend in the number of gun-related incidents, with the most significant declines observed in mid-2013 through 2014.

Figure 5 Monthly Trend in Gun Crimes



Disaggregated analyses were carried out on each offense type as well. Tables 4 and 5 show the change in aggravated assaults with a gun. The change in aggravated assaults with a gun tended to mirror the change in overall gun crimes. The rest of the city saw an overall decrease in aggravated assaults with a gun, with a small increase in 2012 and 2013. Similarly, the PSN area saw general decreases in aggravated assaults with a gun, with small increases in 2012 and 2013. However, the PSN region decreased at a lesser rate than the rest of the city in 2014 (-6.02 vs. -13.81).

Table 4 Aggravated Assault w/ Gun - Rest of City (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	152	147	167	221	220	228	264	267	256	209	157	144	2432	-
11	142	117	169	186	230	240	285	230	205	187	165	179	2335	-3.99%
12	161	144	203	170	233	218	259	245	208	218	174	172	2405	3.00%
13	177	154	169	175	267	266	211	276	232	216	154	128	2425	0.83%
14	144	81	150	157	208	201	227	234	196	186	147	159	2090	-13.81%
15	125	82	138	173	211	209	-	-	-	-	-	-	938	-0.32%

Table 5 Aggravated Assault w/ Gun - PSN Area (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	45	29	49	57	51	50	62	52	58	43	52	43	591	-
11	35	37	38	54	64	45	69	55	43	54	38	53	585	-1.02%
12	33	38	42	60	61	59	76	55	59	44	47	51	625	6.84%
13	44	29	46	50	72	82	69	62	57	54	56	43	664	6.24%
14	35	26	42	49	68	65	73	65	55	55	46	45	624	-6.02%
15	40	24	61	43	59	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	274	-3.86%

Among gun-related offenses, armed robberies appeared to see the most significant declines in both the city and the PSN area. From 2010 to 2015, the city saw a fairly consistent decrease in the number of armed robberies, with 2013 seeing little change. The PSN target area did not observe declines in armed robberies in 2012 and 2013 but witnessed a large decline in 2014. Whereas the overall city saw significant declines in armed robberies in 2014, the PSN area saw fairly dramatic decreases - down 28.31% from 2013.

Table 6 Armed Robbery - Rest of City (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	298	190	175	236	247	232	267	285	256	228	232	230	2876	-
11	224	130	175	172	224	229	254	291	215	215	257	271	2657	-7.61%
12	203	140	137	177	183	205	272	272	208	248	233	240	2518	-5.23%
13	223	179	147	146	212	263	225	272	229	234	185	192	2507	-0.44%
14	167	138	121	134	154	151	207	247	233	196	163	200	2111	-15.80%
15	128	93	111	143	155	179	-	-	-	-	-	-	809	-6.47%

Table 7 Armed Robbery - PSN Area (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	71	36	57	48	73	46	65	76	63	63	69	59	726	-
11	50	27	54	37	52	60	48	68	56	56	60	87	655	-9.78%
12	53	38	41	63	47	57	82	63	72	61	71	85	733	11.91%
13	67	46	39	57	66	65	107	88	62	50	60	56	763	4.09%
14	55	24	37	34	64	41	46	61	50	49	39	47	547	-28.31%
15	48	35	31	41	44	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	254	-0.39%

Homicides with a gun saw variable amounts of change from 2010 to 2015. Following increases in the gun homicide rate in 2011 and 2012, the city saw a general decrease in 2013 and 2014. The PSN area saw similar variability in year-to-year gun homicide rates, with decreases in 2011, 2013, and the first 6 months of 2015. However, these numbers should be interpreted with some degree of caution. Due to relatively low number of gun homicides at the precinct level, small increases in raw numbers may dramatically affect the percentage change.

Table 8 Homicide w/ Gun - Rest of City (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	16	7	12	18	20	17	21	11	15	16	17	21	191	-
11	12	11	19	23	21	25	28	22	19	18	12	24	234	22.51%
12	22	9	14	18	23	23	15	27	30	23	16	17	237	1.28%
13	22	11	14	19	16	17	28	24	14	15	17	20	217	-8.44%
14	4	12	8	17	11	12	19	16	17	15	16	25	172	-20.74%
15	17	10	23	8	19	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	95	48.44%

Table 9 Homicide w/ Gun - PSN Area (Jan 2010 - Jun 2015)

YEAR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL	% CHG
10	5	3	2	6	5	3	7	4	2	8	3	2	50	-
11	9	2	2	7	2	1	3	1	2	4	4	4	41	-18.00%
12	7	2	3	5	7	5	6	8	5	4	4	4	60	46.34%
13	3	5	5	1	6	5	5	11	3	3	3	4	54	-10.00%
14	3	3	1	5	6	7	6	11	10	1	6	2	61	12.96%
15	4	2	3	3	5	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-4.00%

Synthetic Control Model

To evaluate the effect of the PSN intervention a synthetic control model was utilized. This method draws upon areas in the city which did not receive the PSN intervention and weights them, based on a number of variables, to create a synthetic comparison region which resembles the PSN target area prior to the intervention. This allows the direct comparison of the actual PSN target area, which received the intervention, with a counterfactual PSN target area which did not receive the intervention. If the intervention had a significant effect, one would observe higher crime rates post-intervention in the synthetic control than in the actual PSN target area. While other methods of comparison were considered (such as propensity score matching), the synthetic control method is largely considered a superior and more robust alternative.

Scout car areas were used as the unit of analysis for the synthetic control model. Detroit is comprised of 131 scout car areas, 105 of which are outside the PSN target area (Precincts 6 and 8, representing scout car areas 601-612 and 801-814). Areas which did not have any population were excluded, which left 100 scout car areas as part of the donor pool from which the synthetic control could be constructed. Table 10 shows the weighted combination of scout car areas which comprised the synthetic PSN control region. Scout car areas in precincts 2, 5, and 9 represented 70% of the synthetic PSN region, with the remainder made up of precincts 11, 12, 4, and 7.

Table 11 displays the predictor variables used in the construction of the synthetic PSN region. In general, the synthetic and actual PSN region appeared highly similar across a number of variables highly correlated with violent crime in Detroit. Additionally, they were matched on their monthly violent gun crime rates per 1,000 residents.

Table 10 Weights for
Synthetic Control

Scout Car Area	Weight
512	0.183
201	0.157
906	0.131
907	0.122
207	0.088
1102	0.071
1208	0.048
1202	0.047
408	0.045
1206	0.03
709	0.022
507	0.018
411	0.015
505	0.008
1108	0.007
710	0.006

Table 11 Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	PSN Region	Synthetic Control	Rest of City
Population Density	6242.999	7574.419	6190.358
% Male	0.46	0.46	0.48
% Aged 15-24	0.16	0.17	0.16
% White	0.10	0.09	0.13
% Black	0.87	0.86	0.80
% No HS Diploma	0.18	0.20	0.25
% Married	0.29	0.28	0.26
% Below Poverty Line	0.37	0.36	0.41
% Female Headed HH	0.61	0.59	0.47
% On Food Stamps	0.20	0.21	0.21
% Unemployed	0.15	0.15	0.16
% Professionals	0.16	0.16	0.14
% Not Worked in Past Year	0.45	0.46	0.49
% Renter Occupied	0.42	0.44	0.48
% Vacant Homes	0.26	0.26	0.30
% Rent > 30% of Income	0.63	0.51	0.54
% HH w/ 5+ Rooms	0.01	0.03	0.05
% of HH Income < \$25k	0.45	0.46	0.50
Aggravated Assault w/ Gun Rate	0.33	0.32	0.32
Armed Robbery Rate	0.37	0.38	0.36
Homicide w/ Gun Rate	0.02	0.02	0.00

Figure 6 shows the difference in monthly gun crime rates per 1000 residents. The dark black line represents the PSN target area, while the light gray line represents the synthetic control. An observation of this figure shows an overall decreasing trend of gun crime post-intervention in both the PSN target area and the synthetic control region. While the post-intervention gun crime rates in the PSN target area trended somewhat lower than the synthetic control, the difference was relatively minor. Figure 7 shows the difference between the PSN region and the synthetic control region.

In general, the PSN target area's gun crime rate was lower than the synthetic control 18 out of the 30 months post-intervention, with an average difference of -0.019 (a 2% relative decrease). However, the most significant differences between appeared after June of 2014, with the PSN region outperforming the synthetic control in 11 out of the 12 remaining months. Additionally, the magnitude of difference was larger, averaging -0.064 . This represents a 9% decrease relative to the synthetic control and is suggestive that the PSN intervention had a more significant effect a year after its inception.

Figure 6 Comparison of Gun Crime Rate per 1,000 in PSN Region vs. Synthetic Control




Figure 7 Difference in Synthetic Control Region




Table 12 Difference in Gun Crime Rate per 1,000 - PSN vs Synthetic Control by Quarter

	Q1 2013	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Q4 2014	Q1 2015	Q2 2015	Q3 2015
PSN	0.712	0.76	1.053	0.753	0.545	0.715	0.832	0.705	0.513	0.616	0.701
Synthetic	0.831	0.761	0.937	0.827	0.539	0.577	0.823	0.783	0.468	0.725	1.01
Difference	-0.119	-0.001	0.116	-0.074	0.006	0.138	0.009	-0.078	0.045	-0.109	-0.309

Conclusion

The analysis of gun crime trends in the PSN target area indicate that this region saw an overall decline in gun-related aggravated assaults and robberies in 2014 and early 2015. The most significant declines were observed in 2014, with the PSN target area seeing nearly a 17% reduction in gun-related violent offenses. At the same time, the entire city of Detroit saw somewhat similar declines in gun-related crime in 2014 and 2015, with a 15% overall reduction. In magnitude the PSN target area followed the overall declining city trend, with a notably larger reduction in armed robberies in 2014.

Disentangling the effects of the PSN intervention from overall city crime rate trends, other DPD policing initiatives, and changing demographics presented a particularly difficult problem. As described earlier, PSN was implemented during a period of major budgetary restrictions for the city and the police department, including the appointment of a fiscal manager. This resulted in considerable delay in implementing PSN. The PSN team reported an increase in activities in the second half of 2013 through 2014. The trends in gun crime in the PSN target area were consistent with the reported increase in enforcement activities from the latter half of 2013 through 2015. The same period also witnessed other crime control strategies throughout the city. These included the implementation of a COMPSTAT program, Detroit One, a Youth Violence Prevention initiative that resulted in a Ceasefire model being implemented in Precincts 5 and 9; and directed police patrols provided by the Michigan State Police. Thus, the comparison to other parts of the City is not a “clean” comparison to areas receiving basic levels of police service but rather a comparison to areas receiving proactive enforcement attention.

The synthetic control model, which generated a predicted crime rate trend if the PSN intervention had never occurred, indicated modest support for the conclusion that the PSN program resulted in reduced violent crime. Specifically, the PSN target area showed lower crime rates than the synthetic control. These results were more apparent when confined to the last 12 months of the study period (July 2014 - June 2015), where the PSN target area showed an overall 9% decrease in gun crimes relative to the synthetic control. This suggests evidence of a lagged effect of PSN enforcement actions on gun crime in the target area. This was particularly evident in the significant decrease in armed robberies observed in 2014. As a whole, these results indicate cautious optimism for the PSN program in Detroit.

Summary of Findings

PSN provided an infusion of resources at a period when the City of Detroit was experiencing extreme budgetary challenges. DPD experienced the challenge of managing calls for police service with the goal of proactive crime control. Similarly, WCPO and MDOC experienced significant caseload pressures. PSN resources allowed the participating departments to free up staff to participate in this proactive gun violence reduction initiative. The PSN enforcement committee provided a structure to bring together local, state, and federal enforcement personnel to engage in a variety of enforcement, prevention and community engagement activities. Enforcement strategies included long-term investigations and prosecutions of members of violent street groups; directed police patrols in hotspot areas; compliance checks with probationers and parolees; coordinated federal-state prosecution of chronic violent offenders and members of violent street groups. Prevention focused on school-based education programs reaching large numbers of youth (nearly 7,000). Community engagement focused on seasonal crime issues in a mall near the Dearborn-Detroit border as well as Dearborn Police Department’s neighborhood safety seminars and a technology based information sharing. It is safe to say that many of these activities, and the intensity and consistency of these activities, would have been impossible absent the PSN resources.

Interviews with PSN team members indicated consensus that the PSN/CVRP had resulted in unparalleled communication and coordination across the participating agencies. This was also evident in weekly enforcement committee meetings where information was being shared, strategies developed, across local, state, and federal partners.

Gun crime trends suggested declines in overall gun crime with the most apparent effect on armed robbery. The bottom line is that the level of gun crime victimization declined in the target area, particularly in 2014 after PSN was fully operational. The difficulty is in interpreting the extent to which these declines in gun violence were attributable to PSN. The citywide data showed similar declines in gun violence that began earlier than the declines observed in the PSN target area. Thus, it is an open question of whether various initiatives such as COMPSTAT, Detroit One, MSP directed patrols, MDOC utilization of field agents and joint compliance checks, Ceasefire, improved economic conditions, or other factors were affecting citywide gun crime trends.

The most persuasive evidence of a PSN gun crime reduction impact is the comparison with the synthetic controls. The synthetic controls were constructed by identifying police scout car areas most similar to the 6th and 8th precincts. This comparison indicated that in 2014 the PSN target area experienced a 9 percent decline in gun crime when compared to the most similar areas of Detroit.

Lessons Learned and Implications

Consistent with the lessons learned in the PSN national program, Detroit PSN reflected the benefits of establishing partnerships between local, state, and federal criminal justice partners, community partners, and research partners, to focus on a specific type of crime problem – gun and gang violence. The partnership resulted in enhanced communication and coordination of more focused and proactive enforcement coupled with community engagement and school-based prevention. Observations and interviews suggested that PSN increased capacity to address the serious problem of gun violence.

Both the program and the evaluation experienced several limitations. There were bureaucratic delays and city-wide budget constraints that delayed implementation of PSN. One of the key strategies involved long-term investigations of key violent street groups. Many of these investigations resulted in significant federal and state prosecutions but it took time to have a cumulative community-level impact. The research partner team, along with DPD crime analysts, provided initial problem analyses but did not provide ongoing regular problem analyses until 2014. Thus, it was not until late in 2013 and 2014 that all components of DPD Ceasefire were operational.

The evaluation did not include assessment of the impact of community engagement efforts nor of school-based prevention program. Thus, there may be additional PSN impacts that were not accounted for in the present evaluation report. As noted, there were also challenges for the outcome assessment. The delayed implementation made it difficult to establish a clear beginning point from which to measure the impact of PSN. It was also difficult to establish an appropriate

comparison or counterfactual. From a city perspective, PSN was part of a number of related crime prevention and control strategies. Utilizing PSN to address violent gun crime on the city's westside freed up resources to address violent crime in other parts of the city. This, however, complicated the evaluation because it led to proactive policing strategies in the comparison areas. This is an inherent challenge in evaluating community-based crime control strategies that do not have the benefit of an experimental design.

Several suggestions for future gun crime reduction strategies emerge. First, the type of partnerships observed in the PSN/CVRP task force, appear to be an important component of strategic efforts to reduce levels of gun crime and victimization. Second, planning periods to allow for responding to contractual issues and for strategic planning could assist the timeliness of implementation and the coordination of various program components. Third, the greater participation of the research partner in timely and ongoing problem analyses from the outset could have supported the enforcement team in directing investigations, patrols, and compliance checks.

References

- Braga, A.A. 2008. Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies and the prevention of gun homicide. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 36, 332-43.
- Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. 2012. The effects of hot spots policing on crime: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. *Justice Quarterly*. Advance online publication. doi :10.1080/07418825.2012.673632
- Bynum, T., Decker, S.H., Klofas, J., Hipple, N.K., McGarrell, E.F., & McDevitt, J. 2006. *Chronic violent offender strategies: A Project Safe Neighborhoods strategic intervention*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
- Dalton, E. 2002. Targeted crime reduction efforts in ten communities: Lessons for the Project Safe Neighborhoods Initiative. *U.S. Attorney's Bulletin*, 50, 16-25.
- Decker, S.H., McDevitt, J., McGarrell, E.F., Bynum, T., Klofas, J., & Hipple, N.K. 2006. *Gun prosecution case screening: A Project Safe Neighborhoods strategic intervention*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (2015). *Crime in the United States 2013*. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-8/table-8-state-cuts/table_8_offenses_known_to_law_enforcement_michigan_by_city_2013.xls (accessed 8/23/15).
- Hipple, N.K. 2010. "Project Exile Gun Crime Reduction." Pp. 51-58 in *The New Criminal Justice*, edited by J.M. Klofas, N.K. Hipple, and E.F. McGarrell. New York: Routledge.
- McGarrell, E.F., Chermak, S., Weiss, A., & Wilson, J. 2001. Reducing firearms violence through directed police patrol. *Criminology and Public Policy* 1, 1:119-148.
- McGarrell, E.F., N. Corsaro, N.K. Hipple, and T. Bynum. 2010. "Project Safe Neighborhoods and Violent Crime Trends in U.S. Cities: Assessing Violent Crime Impact." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 26,2:165-190.
- McGarrell, E.F. 2010. "Strategic Problem Solving, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and the New Criminal Justice." Pp. 28-36 in *The New Criminal Justice*, edited by J.M. Klofas, N.K. Hipple, and E.F. McGarrell. New York: Routledge.
- McGarrell, E.F. and T.S. Bynum. 2010. "Strategic Problem Solving and Gun Crime Reduction." Pp. 59-68 in *The New Criminal Justice*, edited by J.M. Klofas, N.K. Hipple, and E.F. McGarrell. New York: Routledge.

Papachristos, A., Meares, T., & Fagan, J. 2007. Attention felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago. *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies*, 4, 223-272.

Uchida, C.D. and M.L. Swatt. 2013. Operation LASER and the Effectiveness of Hotspot Patrol: A Panel Analysis. *Police Quarterly* 16,3:287-304.

U.S. Department of Justice. 2001. *Toolkit: Project Safe Neighborhoods – America’s Network Against Gun Violence*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General.